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Congestion pricing offers an appealing solution to urban parking problems. Charging varying rates across
time and space as a function of congestion levels may shift demand and improve allocation of limited
resources. It aims to increase the accessibility of highly desired public goods to consumers who value them
and to reduce traffic caused by drivers searching for available parking spaces. Using data from the City of San
Francisco, both before and after the implementation of a congestion pricing parking program, we estimate the
welfare implications of the policy. We use a two-stage dynamic search model to estimate consumers’ search
costs, distance disutilities, price sensitivities and trip valuations. We find that congestion pricing increases
consumer and social welfare in congested regions but may hurt welfare in uncongested regions. Interestingly,
despite the improved availability, congestion pricing may not necessarily reduce search traffic, because highly
dispersed prices also induce consumers to search for more affordable spaces. In such cases, a simpler pricing
policy may actually achieve higher welfare than a complex one. Lastly, compared to capacity rationing
that imposes limits on parking durations, congestion pricing increases social welfare and has an ambiguous
effect on consumer welfare. The insights from SFpark offer important implications for local governments
considering alternatives for managing parking and congestion, and for public sector managers to evaluate
the tradeoffs between regulation vs. market-based approaches to manage public resources.
Key words : Congestion Pricing, Welfare, Dynamic Search Model, Public Sector, Traffic Management
1. Introduction
One of the challenges in managing public goods is how to achieve an efficient allocation of the
resources while keeping utilizations high. Without interventions from policy makers, individuals
tend to overuse public goods ignoring the negative externalities they impose on others, leading
to congestion and inefficient outcomes. This problem is commonly referred to as the tragedy of
commons (Coman 1911).
This problem is present in urban parking, where the affordable price of public parking causes
some users to overuse it, neglecting the impact of their behavior on others. This behavior can
induce many urban transportation and other problems. As Shoup (2005) writes, “just as cattle
1
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compete in their search for scarce grass, drivers compete in their search for scarce curb parking
spaces. Drivers waste time and fuel, congest traffic, and pollute the air while cruising for curb
parking.” Summarizing sixteen studies, Shoup (2006) found that, on average, 30 percent of urban
traffic was caused by drivers cruising to search for parking rather than driving to their desired
destinations.
There are two potential solutions to the commons problem. One solution is to limit an individual’s
usage, such as by imposing usage limits (e.g., putting limits on parking durations) or by issuing
permits (commonly used in fishing, regional parks, and mining). By limiting parking time and
fining noncompliant users, this policy discourages the abuse of public goods, thereby increases
their accessibility to the public. Another solution modulates price to modulate demand to better
match demand with limited supply. Examples include congestion pricing, which is used in traffic
management and carbon emission management.
Congestion pricing has long been proposed as a solution to manage traffic congestion (Vickrey
1952). However, only recently has it been put into practice, due to the technological implementation
challenges. To implement congestion pricing, cities must install technologies such as cameras or
sensors to track congestion levels at frequent intervals. A few cities have experimented with different
variations of congestion pricing: New York City’s PARK Smart (2008), San Francisco’s SFpark
(2011), and Berkeley’s GoBerkeley (2012).With varying levels of pricing complexity, all programs
reported increased accessibility and lower congestion (see program reports for details).1
Congestion pricing used in parking control works similarly to dynamic pricing used by airlines
and hotels—it uses prices to shift demand and to allocate limited capacity—yet the objective is
different. Whereas airlines and hotels use revenue management to maximize revenue (or profit),
cities implement congestion pricing to increase availability and accessibility of public goods, and
to reduce the negative externalities from overusing public resources.
Using SFpark—the congestion pricing parking program recently implemented by the City of
San Francisco—as a testbed, we wish to answer the following questions in this paper: (1) Would
congestion pricing more efficiently allocate public resources, and more precisely, improve welfare
via that allocation? (2) What are the caveats of implementing congestion pricing in public sectors?
and (3) Which policy, imposing usage limits or congestion pricing, is more efficient in allocating
limited public resources?
To answer these questions, we model a consumer’s parking decision using a two-stage dynamic
structural model. In the first stage, a consumer decides whether to drive and, if so, whether to
1 PARK Smart Greenwich Village Pilot Program — Results. June 2009. New York City Department of Transportation.
Pilot Project Evaluation. 2014. San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (SFMTA). GoBerkeley Pilot Program
Results and Next Steps. December 16, 2014. Berkeley City Council.
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park directly at a garage or to search for on-street parking. If a consumer decides to search, in the
second stage, she will make a dynamic decision of whether to park on street, continue searching or
abandon searching. We estimate consumers’ search costs, distance disutilities and price sensitivities
using availability and payment data made available by the SFpark program. We use the estimates
to quantify the effect of congestion pricing on consumer welfare, social welfare and search traffic.
Our model differs from most other structural search models in two ways. First, in our setting,
not all consumers search. We only observe consumers’ parking locations conditional on searching.
To analyze what would happen with an alternative parking policy, we need to know where other
consumers would park if they choose to drive. We therefore model the endogenous search decision
explicitly, and we use the observations from the fixed pricing period to uncover the distribution of
the underlying demand. We then use the estimated underlying demand distribution as an input
when we estimate other parameters, assuming that the underlying demand distribution is constant
before and after the implementation of congestion pricing for the same region, time and day.
Second, consumers in our context search on a two-dimensional map, while in most other struc-
tural search models (e.g., job search, product search), finding the next object is a realization of a
random draw from the entire set of options, either with or without replacement. Searching in a
two-dimensional space leads to a substantial challenge in modeling consumers’ decisions and solv-
ing for the optimal search path, because a consumer’s decision at every step will affect the available
future options. To address this challenge, we imbed a random walk strategy with no immediate
return to the dynamic search process. This allows us to capture the randomness in consumers’
decisions with reasonable complexity and nuance, while avoiding the curse of dimensionality in a
dynamic structural model.
We find several interesting results. First, our empirical results indicate that the effect of conges-
tion pricing on consumer welfare may be region dependent—congestion pricing may either increase
or decrease welfare depending on the characteristics of the region we study. We find that congestion
pricing increased welfare in popular regions with moderate to high congestion levels. However, it
actually resulted in a welfare decrease when implemented in less-congested areas. Second, while
congestion pricing reduces search cost because popular blocks become more available, it induces
another form of searching. An increased level of price dispersion induces more searching for better
prices, particularly if consumers are price sensitive and if prices are highly dispersed geographically
and updated frequently. To balance the positive availability effect and the negative price-search
effect, we find that a simpler three-tier pricing policy may actually increase welfare relative to a
more complex policy. Finally, we find congestion pricing leads to higher social welfare compared to a
policy that imposes time limits on parking, while the effect on consumer welfare can be ambiguous.
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What we learn from SFpark offers important lessons to local governments considering alternative
approaches to managing parking congestion. We document evidence that congestion pricing is
indeed a viable approach to manage highly utilized public resources. It achieves higher welfare by
allocating the resource to those who value it the most.
However, the implementation of congestion pricing is not without caveats. First, congestion
pricing may not work as well in uncongested areas. Therefore, governments should not blindly
implement congestion pricing in all regions. Rather, they should first assess the region’s utilization.
In under-utilized regions, the primary concern is not to redistribute demand, but to improve uti-
lization. Therefore, a uniform pricing policy with lower rates may achieve a better welfare outcome
than congestion pricing. Second, if the pricing structure gets very complex, congestion pricing may
actually lead to more search traffic, not less. Therefore, a simpler policy may achieve higher welfare
than a complex one.
Finally, our results contribute to a better understanding of ways to manage scarce public
resources. Public sector managers often mitigate over-utilization by rationing capacity through
usage limits or permits. We demonstrate that dynamic pricing can be a more efficient approach.
Whereas capacity rationing usually fails to account for the heterogeneity in consumer demand,
dynamic pricing allocates highly-demanded resources to those who need or value them the most. Of
course, there are other implementation considerations such as feasibility, cost, and equity concerns.
However, our analysis offers quantifiable results and a generalizable methodology for public sector
managers to better evaluate the tradeoffs involved in making such decisions.
2. Literature Review
This paper is related to three streams of literature: (1) dynamic pricing, price discrimination and
welfare analysis, (2) public sector operations management, and (3) consumer demand modeling
and structural estimation. We review each stream and discuss our contributions below.
Dynamic Pricing, Price Discrimination and Welfare Analysis. First, our paper con-
tributes to the theory and practice of dynamic pricing. In the past several decades, dynamic pricing
has been successfully applied in a number of industries. American Airlines and Delta Airlines credit
revenue management techniques for $300 to $500 million revenue gains per year (Boyd 1998). Sim-
ilarly, Marriott’s successful execution of revenue management has added $150 to $200 million in
annual revenue (Marriott and Cross 2000). More recently, dynamic pricing was adopted in addi-
tional industries, such as sports, concert planning and retailing (Shapiro and Drayer 2014, Xu et al.
2016, Tereyagoglu et al. 2016, Fisher et al. 2015, Moon et al. 2017). This line of literature has
focused primarily on profit/revenue maximization objectives (see Talluri and van Ryzin 2004 for
an overview), with only a few recent exceptions that analyze consumer welfare under myopic vs.
strategic consumers (Aflaki et al. 2016, Chen and Gallego 2016).
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The ambiguous welfare effect has been a common thread in the literature on price discrimination
(of which dynamic pricing is one example) for years. Starting from the seminal work by Robinson
(1933), studies have found that price discrimination may or may not lead to welfare improvement,
which depends on the interplay of many factors including output (Schmalensee 1981, Varian 1985),
demand functions (Cowan 2007), and the presence of consumption externalities (Adachi 2005).
Few empirical analyses examine the welfare effect of price discrimination. Leslie (2004) is one
of the first studies that measures the welfare effect empirically. Unlike revenue or profit, welfare is
not directly observable. Therefore, it is necessary to develop structural models to explicitly capture
consumers’ utility functions and decision processes. Using Broadway theater as an example, Leslie
(2004) finds that while price discrimination leads to a 5% increase in firm profit, its impact on
consumer welfare is actually negligible. More recently, using airline data, Lazarev (2013) compares
inter-temporal price discrimination to alternative pricing schemes (free resale, zero cancellation
fees and third-degree price discrimination), and finds that the welfare effect is indeed ambiguous
and can be moderated by the mix of business vs. leisure travelers.
We contribute to this line of literature by empirically analyzing the welfare effect of dynamic
pricing through structural models. We offer insights on the conditions affecting the sign of the
welfare effect in the context of a newly implemented dynamic pricing program in the public sector,
where welfare is of particular interest.
Public Sector Operations Management. Recently, more research has devoted attention to
public sector operations management. While a large body of research has focused on healthcare,
research is also burgeoning in education, public transportation, utility, and natural resource man-
agement. Despite diverse contexts, a common theme that differentiates public versus private sector
operations management is the public sector’s focus on societal outcomes rather than profitability.
As a result, much emphasis has been placed on quality (e.g., Kc and Terwiesch 2009), congestion
and utilization (e.g., Powell et al. 2012, Jaeker and Tucker 2017), accessibility (e.g., Kim et al.
2015, Gallien et al. 2016, Kabra et al. 2015), and welfare and equity (e.g., Wang et al. 2017, Ashlagi
and Shi 2016, Kok et al. 2016).
In the economics literature, since Coman (1911), the problem of the commons has become
of greater concern, due to the rapid growth of world economy (see Stavins 2011 for a review
and references therein). Stavins (2011) reviews and discusses two prevailing approaches used to
address the commons problem: the command and control approach (setting usage limits) and the
market-based approach (setting prices to internalize the externalities). Both approaches have been
criticized: the command and control approach offers relatively little flexibility, ignores heterogeneity
among users, and imposes additional costs to society; the market-based approach is often deemed
as socially more efficient, at least from a theoretical standpoint, but it is often difficult to optimize
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the prices with respect to unpredictable reactions by individual decision makers facing complex
price structures.
Indeed, in the transportation management literature, Bonsall et al. (2007) review multiple cases
of congestion pricing used in public transportation, and attribute failures of many such programs
to pricing structure complexity and consumer uncertainties about prices charged. Despite the long-
standing literature on optimal pricing (e.g., Vickrey 1952, Williamson 1966, Arnott and Inci 2006),
empirical analyses of consumer reaction to dynamic pricing in public transportation are relatively
scarce. Two recent studies (Pierce and Shoup 2013, Ottosson et al. 2013) estimate demand elasticity
to parking price changes using regression approaches. Without explicit consumer decision models
and structural estimation, however, they are not able to offer insights on welfare. We find that the
market-based approach indeed leads to greater social welfare compared to a command and control
policy, but the effect on consumer welfare is ambiguous. Moreover, our work is related to studies of
congestion in service operations, many of which analyze the role of price in controlling congestion
levels in services (see Hassin and Haviv 2003 for a review and references therein).
Consumer Demand Modeling and Structural Estimation. Empirical work that incorpo-
rates consumer models is growing in operations management. Our work belongs to the increasing
number of papers that use consumer choice models (Vulcano et al. 2010, Lederman et al. 2014,
Kabra et al. 2015, Fisher et al. 2015), as well as models with dynamic decisions (Aks¸in et al. 2013,
Li et al. 2014, Yu et al. 2016, Moon et al. 2017).
Our work is also closely related to literature on structural estimation of search models. This line
of research estimates consumer search cost in different contexts, with (De Los Santos et al. 2012,
Honka 2014, Koulayev 2014, Chen and Yao 2016) or without (Hortacsu and Syverson 2004, Hong
and Shum 2006, Kim et al. 2010) observing consumers’ search paths. Our work is similar to the
latter in the sense that we estimate search costs and other parameters without observing search
paths. However, our data is more fined-grained than theirs and the search is multi-dimensional.
In particular, the fact that the search is conducted on a two-dimensional map restricts the set of
available options at every step of search. Embedding a random walk with no immediate return
to the dynamic search process allows us to address the challenge of dimensionality in estimation,
while at the same time accounting for randomness in the consumers’ search process.
3. Background on the SFpark Program and Data Description
In this section, we introduce the SFpark program. We then describe the data used for this study
and provide summary statistics for periods before and after the implementation of the program.
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3.1. The SFpark program
The City of San Francisco implemented SFpark in 2011 to address urban parking problems via
congestion pricing. Rather than charging a constant rate at all locations and at all times, the
program adjusts parking rates according to demand. One of the challenges in implementing con-
gestion pricing is that it requires constant monitoring of parking space utilization to adequately
adjust prices. SFpark adopts several technologies, including parking sensors and smart meters, to
track availability and evaluate utilization. The adoption of these technologies enabled SFpark to
implement a data-driven parking pricing strategy. It also enabled researchers to conduct detailed
analysis of consumer response to congestion pricing and its welfare implications using fine-grained
data that were not previously available.
The San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (SFMTA) pilot the program in seven park-
ing management regions (see Figure 5), which included 6,000 metered spaces amounting to roughly
a quarter of the total metered parking spaces in San Francisco. The pilot started in August 2011
and ended in June 2013. The pilot was deemed successful in reallocating demand, reducing con-
gestion, and generating additional revenues from parking. As a result, the program was rolled out
to the entire city in late 2013.
Here we provide the details of the policy and describe how SFpark adjusts hourly parking
rates dynamically based on observed occupancy rates. The program divides each paid-parking day
(Monday to Saturday) into three time windows: morning (9am-12pm), noon (12pm-3pm), and
afternoon (3pm-6pm). Parking is free at other times and on Sundays. For each time window, SFpark
uses the block-level average occupancy rate to determine the hourly rate for parking, where the
occupancy rate is defined as the fraction of time that a block is occupied.
SFpark started tracking the occupancy rates of the pilot areas in April 2011, four months before
the official start of the program. They used occupancy data during that period to determine price
adjustment rules for the pilot, which started in August 2011. Before the implementation, parking
was $2 per hour for all blocks. After the implementation, SFpark raised the block’s prices by
$0.25/hour if the occupancy rate was above 80%, lowered it by $0.25/hour if the occupancy rate
was between 60% to 80%, and lowered it by $0.50/hour if the occupancy rate was below 60%.
In addition, SFpark also adjusted off-street parking prices (city-managed parking garages) using
similar rules.2 Finally, SFpark set an upper- and a lower-bound for the hourly rate—the rate could
not exceed $6.00/hour or go below $0.25/hour. As a result, parking rates vary by block, time of
day, day of week, and month. Over the two-year pilot period, SFpark made ten on-street rate
2 Before the implementation, the garage hourly parking price ranged from $2 to $2.5. After the implementation, the
hourly rate was raised by $0.50 for blocks with occupancy rates above 80%, and lowered by $0.50 for blocks with
occupancy rates below 40%.
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adjustments and eight off-street rate adjustments (i.e., every 8 to 12 weeks). All adjustments were
announced on the program’s website at least seven days before the changes went into effect.
3.2. Data
We use three datasets provided by SFpark and choose the time period and regions for this study
based on the data quality. First, parking sensor data consists of hourly block-level occupancy rates
from April 2011 until June 2013. After late 2012, however, this sensor data becomes incomplete
due to battery failures and sensor outages. Second, on-street meter payment data contains all
parking transactions starting from the first quarter of 2011, and includes the start and end time,
the payment type and the payment amount. The meter payment data is more reliable than the
parking sensor data because it is not subject to battery failures. However, meter payment data
is not an accurate proxy for availability, because drivers may park for longer or shorter periods
than paid for or may park illegally without paying. Therefore, as long as the sensors have not
experienced massive failures, the sensor data is a more accurate source for calculating occupancy
rates. We therefore used the meter payment data to determine parking locations and durations,
but not to infer occupancy rates. Third, off-street garage data contains usage data for publicly-
owned garages. We observe transaction-level payment data in the same level of detail as the meter
payment data. The garage transaction data is not subject to illegal or under/overtime parking,
because payment is determined based on actual parking time.
Due to the increasing sensor failures starting in late 2012, we only use data from April 2011 to
July 2012. In addition, to control for seasonality and make fair comparisons between the before
and after periods, we use data from the same months in both years: April to July 2011 (the before
period), and April to July in 2012 (the after period) as shown in Figure 6.3 The SFMTA extended
the parking time limit in the pilot areas from 2 to 4 hours in late April, 2011. To make fair
comparisons, we exclude the days in April 2011 in which the parking time limit was only 2 hours.
We also exclude consumers who parked in a garage for more than 4 hours from the main analysis.
We do account for them when calculating garage occupancy rates. Among the seven piloted regions,
we focus on the ones that are relatively isolated from the others: Fillmore, Marina, and Mission.4
Table 1 presents the before and after summary statistics of the hourly parking rates and occu-
pancy rates for the three regions. Consistent with SFpark guidelines, we use average occupancy
rates to divide the parking blocks to high (average occupancy rates above 80%), medium (60%
3 Even during these periods, there were some occasional meter failures. In these cases, for each block-hour under
consideration, the parking sensor data marks the status of the spaces as “unknown” and indicates the duration of
the failure. We exclude the “unknown” time from the calculation of occupancy rates.
4 Fisherman’s Wharf is also relatively isolated. However, since it is primarily a tourist destination where consumers
might not have much knowledge of the SFpark program, we do not include it in our study.
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and 80% occupancy), and low-utilization (below 60% occupancy). Table 1 shows that after the
implementation of congestion pricing, the mean parking rate increased by around 150% for high-
utilization blocks, and decreased by between 40% - 70% for low-utilization blocks in Marina and
Fillmore. In Mission, there were no high utilization blocks in the before period, and the parking
rates in the low utilization blocks decreased slightly.5 As expected, the average occupancy rate for
low-utilization blocks increased while the average occupancy rate for high- and medium-utilization
blocks decreased. This provides evidence of shifts in demand as a response to congestion pricing.
Figure 7 shows how parking rates vary between blocks and how occupancy rates change in the
after period via street map snapshots in Fillmore. The figure illustrates clearly that prices vary
substantially by blocks—a driver could save $2 to $3 per hour by driving one or two additional
blocks. The figure also demonstrates that the congestion levels are more evenly distributed during
the after period than the before period.
4. Model
There are Mr consumers who are interested in visiting region r (i.e., Fillmore, Marina, Mission). We
specify the decision process of a consumer i, whose trip destination is at block b∗i , and is interested
in parking for a duration of hi hours. That is, block b
∗
i is the ideal parking location for consumer i
under conditions of unlimited availability of free parking. Although we do not observe consumers’
ideal locations, we will estimate the distribution of ideal locations of the Mr consumers over the
set of blocks, Br, in region r, from the volumes and patterns of parking. To this end, let ω
∗
rtd(b)
denote the fraction of Mr consumers whose ideal location is block b during time of the day t (i.e.,
morning, noon, or afternoon) on day d, where
∑
b∈Br ω
∗
rtd(b) = 1.
6 We allow this fraction to vary
by time and day to account for variations in consumers’ trip destinations. For example, a higher
fraction of consumers may wish to shop at Urban Outfitters than visit the post office on a Friday
afternoon compared to Tuesday morning. We will explain how we estimate ω∗rtd(b) later in detail.
We assume that the ideal locations and trip durations are determined exogenously. While there
may be situations when a consumer is willing to change her destination or duration based on
congestion levels and parking rates, these two variables are largely determined by the purpose of
the trip. For example, the destination of a consumer who plans to buy an iPhone is the Apple store,
and the duration of the trip is determined by the expected time it takes to shop and purchase an
iPhone. We further assume that the trip durations do not change once a customer has parked.
5 Some parking spaces in Mission were blocked due to construction in March 2012. This induced higher occupancy
rates in this area. In order to make fair comparisons, we treat these blocks as available in welfare and counter-factual
analyses.
6 Consistent SFpark, we define morning as 9am-12pm, noon as 12pm-3pm, and afternoon as 3pm-6pm.
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We model consumers’ driving and parking behavior as a series of decisions. We assume that each
consumer chooses among three options: (1) drive to the region and search for on-street parking,
(2) drive to the region but park directly in the public garage without searching,7 or (3) choose
an outside option, which includes staying home, using other modes of transportation, or parking
elsewhere.8 A consumer will choose the option that gives her the highest expected utility.
Without loss of generality, we normalize the mean utility of the outside option to zero. Let ui0
denote the utility of the outside option for consumer i,
ui0 = i0 ≡ V oi ,
where i0 is an idiosyncratic shock to the outside utility of consumer i, which follows a normal
distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation σ.
Consumer i obtains a mean trip value, virtd, from driving to the region relative to the outside
option, irrespective of whether she parks at the garage directly or searches for on-street parking.
We let the mean utility of driving to be a linear function of the duration of parking. Specifically,
virtd = α+βXrtdhi,
where Xrtd contains the intercept and dummy variables indicating time of the day, day of week,
and month.9 Even though all parameters in this paper are region specific, for brevity we omit the
subscript r for parameters.
A consumer who decides to drive and park directly at the garage will obtain value virtd + ig
from the trip, where ig is an idiosyncratic shock to consumer i’s utility from parking at the garage,
which follows the same distribution as i0. At the same time, she will incur the cost of walking to
her ideal location, b∗i , from the garage and the garage parking fee, which is based on the hourly
parking rate at the garage, Pbg , and the parking duration, hi. Specifically, let uig denote the utility
of parking at the garage for consumer i, then
uig = α+βXrtdhi + ig − ηid(b∗i , bg)− θiPbghi ≡ V garagei ,
7 In most regions we study, there is one public garage operated by the city. In cases where there are multiple garages,
a consumer chooses the one with the highest utility based on her destination. Since we do not have data from private
garages in the corresponding regions, we include parking at a private garage as part of the outside option.
8 We do not explicitly model the choice of a departure time (e.g., morning or afternoon, Monday or Tuesday). However,
such inter-temporal shifts in demand are incorporated implicitly, to some extent, through the outside option. For
instance, high prices on Tuesday afternoons result in fewer consumers driving to their destinations and more consumers
choosing the outside option.
9 We have also analyzed alternative model specifications, where virtd is a function of Xrtd only, a function of hi only,
or a linear additive function of Xrtd and hi. None of these specifications fit our empirical observations as well.
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where ηi denotes consumer i’s cost of parking one block away from the destination, d(b
∗
i , bg) denotes
the distance from the garage to consumer i’s destination, b∗i ,
10 and θi denotes consumer i’s price
sensitivity. We assume that there is always an available parking space at the garage.11
Finally, a consumer who chooses to drive to the region and search for on-street parking will
either end up parking at a block that she finds available and affordable, or may eventually decide
to abandon searching and either park at the garage or choose the outside option (e.g., give up
the trip or park elsewhere). If she parks on-street, she will obtain value virtd + is, where is is an
idiosyncratic shock to consumer i’s utility from on-street parking and follows the same distribution
as i0 and ig. Note that all utility shocks, i0, ig and is, are observable to the consumer, but not
to researchers. On the cost side, the consumer pays for parking, and incurs any search costs as well
as a cost of walking to her destination if she parks elsewhere. We model the consumer’s search for
on-street parking as a dynamic search model and explain it in detail below.
4.1. Dynamic Search Model
States, Actions and Utilities We derive the general model of search under congestion pricing,
where prices may vary across blocks and by time of day, day of week, and month. Fixed pricing is a
special case of the general model. On the kth search, consumer i arrives at block bk, k= 1,2,3, ....
There are three actions, a, that she can choose from: continue searching (a= 0), park at the current
block if there is a spot available (a= 1), or stop searching for on-street parking (a= 2). She chooses
the option that gives her the highest expected utility. The utility of each option depends on the
following state variables, which are realized after consumer i arrives to the block:
• bk: the block that the consumer arrives at on the kth search;
• Prtdbk : the hourly parking price at block bk in region r at time t on day d;
• Artdbk : the availability of block bk in region r at time t on day d. Artdbk equals one if there is
at least one parking spot available and zero otherwise;
• irtdbk : the shock to the cost of searching observed by consumer i at block bk in region r at
time t on day d.
Consumer i’s utility from choosing an action a at block bk is given by
ui(bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk , irtdbk ;a). We specify the utility from each action below.
10 The distance between two blocks is calculated as the minimum number of blocks that one has to walk from one
block to the other. We assume all blocks have same length.
11 Based on garage payment data, these garages are never full and the maximum occupancy rates are 75%, 72%, and
38% for Marina, Fillmore and Mission, respectively.
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• If consumer i decides to stop searching for on-street parking (a= 2), she faces two options. She
can either park at the garage or choose the outside option (e.g., give up the trip completely,
park at a private garage, etc.), and would choose the option that maximizes her utility.12
ui(bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk , irtdbk ; 2) = max (V
garage
i , V
o
i )≡ V garage|oi .
• If consumer i decides to park on-street (a= 1), then when the block is available, Artdbk = 1,
she gets the utility:
ui(bk, Prtdbk ,1, irtdbk ; 1) = virtd + is− ηid(b∗i , bk)− θiPrtdbkhi ≡ V parki (bk, Prtdbk).
If there is no parking spot available in the block, Artdbk = 0, she cannot park there. In that
case, we denote her utility from parking by negative infinity.
ui(bk, Prtdbk ,0, irtdbk ; 0) =−∞.
• If consumer i decides to continue searching, a= 0, she gets the expected utility:
ui(bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk , irtdbk ; 0)
= −siirtdbk +E
[
max
a={0,1,2}
ui(bk+1, Prtdbk+1 ,Artdbk+1 , rtdbk+1 ;a)|(bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk , rtdbk)
]
,
≡ −siirtdbk +V searchi (bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk , irtdbk),
where si is consumer i’s per block search cost and irtdbk is the shock to search cost si. That is,
we assume that the actual cost incurred by continuing to search, siirtdbk , depends on both the per
block search cost, si, which is known to the consumer before searching, and a search cost shock
irtdbk , which is only realized after arriving at block bk. The shocks, irtdbk , are i.i.d across consumers,
regions, time, day and blocks, and follow a standard log normal distribution, i.e., log(irtdbk) follows
the standard normal distribution.13 The lognormal distribution guarantees that the overall search
cost siirtdbk is non-negative (i.e., a customer will not give up an available parking spot because she
suddenly “enjoys” searching). The expectation term in the above equation is the expected value
12 We assume that the set of outside options available after the search starts is the same as that in the first stage.
Ideally, we would allow them to be different, as after the search starts, some outside options would be less appealing.
For example, while a consumer may choose the private garage or give up the trip completely, she might not choose
to drive back home and get a cab. However, since we cannot empirically distinguish between customers who choose
the outside option in the first stage versus those who do so in the second stage, we assume that the two are the same.
Alternatively, it is possible to assume that once the search starts, the outside options are no longer available. Our
conclusions are robust to this alternative specification.
13 As we shall discuss in the estimation section, si also follows a lognormal distribution, i.e., log si ∼N(µs, σs). There-
fore, siirtdbk is also lognormally distributed. Note that without observing individual search paths, it is impossible to
separately estimate the variances of si and irtdbk . We therefore standardize the distribution of irtdbk to a standard
lognormal distribution.
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of continuing to search once arriving at block bk. The expectation is taken with respect to the
conditional distribution of state variables (bk+1, Prtdbk+1 ,Artdbk+1 , irtdbk+1) given the current state
variables (bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk , irtdbk). If a consumer continues to search, she will follow a random walk
strategy (with no immediate return) and will arrive at one of the adjacent blocks randomly.
Ideally, we would have liked to model shocks specific to searching each of the adjacent blocks as
modulated by the relative costs, such as from having to wait to turn left, proceeding straight with
the flow of the traffic, or quickly turning right on a red light. Although intellectually appealing,
including block-specific shocks would introduce three unobserved state variables (most blocks have
three adjacent blocks at each end) which increases the estimation complexity substantially. With-
out much loss of generality, we introduce one shock to the search cost, which captures, for example,
the general traffic condition that makes a consumer more or less willing to continue searching. To
introduce randomness in the block to search next, we further assume that if the consumer continues
searching, she will choose one of the adjacent blocks randomly. This allows for idiosyncratic shocks
that affect a consumer’s stopping decision without over-complicating the model and the estima-
tion, while at the same time incorporating randomness in search paths. Although the random walk
assumption abstracts away from some decisions (e.g., which block to drive to based on different
beliefs about the expected utility of each adjacent block), it does offer reasonable levels of complex-
ity and nuance. Given the many transient random factors at play (traffic, blockage, road condition,
traffic lights, emotions, etc.) and limited deliberation time in traffic, a random walk may actually
be a more realistic model of consumer behavior. In sum, the model incorporates randomness in
both the decision to continue searching (through the idiosyncratic shock to search cost) and in the
search paths (from the random walk).
Evolution of States and Consumer Beliefs As discussed previously, the evolution of the
state variable bk follows a random walk with no immediate return. That is, a consumer has equal
probabilities to transition from the current block to any of the adjacent blocks. For simplicity
of illustration, we slightly abuse notation by ignoring the direction of driving (i.e., which block
a consumers searches next), but we simulate driving directions in our estimation via Simulated
Methods of Moments. At the initial block, the direction of driving is randomly generated, and the
remaining blocks are generated from a random walk with no immediate return. Denote Brbk as the
set of adjacent blocks accessible from the current block bk, and |Brbk | as the number of the adjacent
blocks. The joint evolution of state variables Prtdbk and Artdbk depends on the region, time and day,
and the location of the current block. For the evolution of the search cost shock, recall that irtdbk
is i.i.d. across consumers, regions, times, days, and blocks. We also assume that it is independent
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from Prtdbk and Artdbk . Under these assumptions, when a consumer decides to continue searching
(i.e., a= 0), the transition probability is:
Pr
(
bk+1, Prtdbk+1 ,Artdbk+1 , rtdbk+1 ; 0|bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk , irtdbk
)
=
{
1
|Brbk |
fP,Artdb
(
Prtdbk+1 ,Artdbk+1 |bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk
)
f (irtdbk+1), if b∈Brbk
0, otherwise,
where fP,Artdb and f
 are the density functions of the state variables.
Next, we discuss consumer beliefs. We assume that consumers have rational expectations about
the distributions of price, availability and search cost shock. A fully rational consumer would need
to possess an extreme level of sophistication: not only would she form rational expectations of
the availability, price and search cost shock at each specific block, she would also form rational
expectations of the spatial correlations of these state variables, and would therefore update her
belief about the distribution of these state variables at a future block based on the observed states
of all previous blocks visited. Such assumption not only introduces a substantial computational
burden to the estimation of a dynamic model with multiple state variables, but it is also too
complex from a consumer’s perspective.
Instead, we simplify beliefs and decisions by assuming that consumers’ belief of Prtdbk and Artdbk
are i.i.d. across block bk. Under this assumption, consumers still have different expectations about
the price and availability in different hours of a day, on different days, and in different regions.
However, within a region and at a given time t and day d, all blocks will appear ex-ante the same.
To explain, taking availability as an example, the assumption implies that a consumer forms an
expectation that all blocks have the same probability to be available and that this expectation is
rational. That is, this probability equals the observed average probability of a block being available
across all blocks in the region at time t on day d. Specifically, let φrtdb denote the probability of
block b being available (i.e., at least one spot in the block is available) in region r at time t on day
d, and φ˜rtdb denotes consumers’ belief of availability. We have φ˜rtdb =
∑
b∈Br φrtdb
|Br| ≡ φrtd. Note that
whether a consumer finds a block available is based on the real-time availability of the block, rather
than the average availability. In other words, consumers’ beliefs are correct on average, but not for
a specific snapshot. We further assume that consumers do not update their beliefs after observing
the states of the current block.14 Under such assumptions, the expected value for a customer who
continues to search can be written as:
V searchi (bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk , irtdbk)
14 As noted previously, it is possible to consider a model where consumers update their beliefs at every step. However,
such a model requires that consumers know the spatial conditional probability functions of the states at one block
given those observed at other blocks. This would make a consumer’s decision extremely complex and introduce
significant computational challenges to the estimation. Even though our model does not allow updating, we do conduct
sensitivity analyses where consumers have different beliefs across blocks according to their popularity levels.
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= E
[
max
a={0,1,2}
ui(bk+1, Prtdbk+1 ,Artdbk+1 , rtdbk+1 ;a)|(bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk , rtdbk)
]
= E
[
max
a={0,1,2}
ui(bk+1, Prtdbk+1 ,Artdbk+1 , rtdbk+1 ;a)|bk
]
≡ V searchi (bk).
That is, the expected value of searching, V searchi (bk), is a function of the current block bk, and
it varies across consumers due to differences in parameters and ideal locations. Note that the
second equality above follows from the fact that consumers do not update their beliefs of price and
availability, and that the search shocks rtdbk are i.i.d across blocks.
Although consumers may not have complete knowledge of the states of every individual block, it
may be too restrictive to assume that consumers’ price and availability beliefs are identical for all
blocks. We analyze an alternative partial-knowledge model where we group blocks into three levels
(high, medium, and low) according to their popularity before the implementation of congestion
pricing.15 Thus, we assume that consumers knew the prior popularity level of a block, and form
respective conditional rational expectations of all state variables. For example, the probabilities
of finding a block with high, medium and low popularity available are φHrtd, φ
M
rtd, φ
L
rtd, respectively,
and each probability equals to the average availability probability of all blocks of the particular
type. Note that under this assumption, consumers will no longer follow the random walk strategy.
Rather, they will choose the next block knowing each adjacent block’s popularity level. In other
words, a consumer will follow an optimal search path defined by where to start and which block
to drive to next if she continues searching. We present the details of the consumer decision process
in Appendix D.3.
Optimal Decision Rule The optimal decision rule, a∗i (bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk , irtdbk), of consumer i
can be characterized as follows:
• If the current block is available, i.e., Artdbk = 1, a consumer can choose from three potential
actions: continue searching (a= 0), park at the current location (a= 1), or abandon on-street
parking (a= 2). A consumer will choose the action that gives her the highest utility:
a∗i (bk, Prtdbk ,1, irtdbk)
=

0, if − siirtdbk +V searchi (bk)>max
(
V
garage|o
i , V
park
i (bk, Prtdbk)
)
1, if V parki (bk, Prtdbk)≥max
(
V
garage|o
i ,−siirtdbk +V searchi (bk)
)
2, otherwise.
15 Empirically, we determine whether a block has a high, medium, or low popularity based on SFpark ’s definition.
High popularity blocks are those with an average occupancy rate of 80% or higher before implementation. Medium
popularity blocks are those with average occupancy rates of between 60% and 80%. Low popularity blocks are those
with average occupancy rates of 60% or lower.
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• If the current block is unavailable, i.e., Artdbk = 0, a consumer has two options to choose from:
continue searching (a= 0) and stop searching (a= 2).
a∗i (bk, Prtdbk ,0, irtdbk) =
{
0, if − siirtdbk +V searchi (bk)>V garage|oi
2, otherwise.
Let u∗i (bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk , irtdbk) denote the maximum utility a consumer can get after arriving at
block bk, i.e.,
u∗i (bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk , irtdbk) = max
a={0,1,2}
ui(bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk , irtdbk ;a).
• When the block is available, i.e., Artdbk = 1,
u∗i (bk, Prtdbk ,1, irtdbk)
=

−siirtdbk +V searchi (bk), if − siirtdbk +V searchi (bk)>max
(
V
garage|o
i , V
park
i (bk, Prtdbk)
)
,
V parki (bk, Prtdbk), if V
park
i (bk, Prtdbk)≥max
(
V
garage|o
i ,−siirtdbk +V searchi (bk)
)
,
V
garage|o
i , otherwise.
=

−siirtdbk +V searchi (bk), if irtdbk <
V searchi (bk)−V
garage|o
i
si
, Prtdbk ≥
siirtdbk
−V searchi (bk)+vrtd+irtd−ηid(b∗i ,bk)
θihi
,
V parki (bk, Prtdbk), if Prtdbk <
vrtd+irtd−ηid(b∗i ,bk)−V
garage|o
i
θihi
, irtdbk >
V searchi (bk)−V parki (bk,Prtdbk )
si
,
V
garage|o
i , otherwise.
• If the block is unavailable, i.e., Artdbk = 0,
u∗i (bk, Prtdbk ,0, irtdbk)
=
{
−siirtdbk +V searchi (bk), if − siirtdbk +V searchi (bk)>V garage|oi ,
V
garage|o
i , otherwise,
=
{
−siirtdbk +V searchi (bk), if irtdbk <
V searchi (bk)−V
garage|o
i
si
,
V
garage|o
i , otherwise.
V searchi (bk) can be calculated recursively (see Appendix A).
4.2. Choice of Driving
Next, we return to the discussion of the consumer’s initial decision. Recall that in the first stage,
consumer i chooses among three options: (1) drive to the region and search for on-street parking,
(2) drive to the region but park directly at a public garage without searching, and (3) choose the
outside option. We have previously specified the utility of the latter two options. We now derive
the expected utility of the first option. Denote the expected utility of a consumer i who decides to
drive and search for on-street parking by uis. Then,
uis = max
b1∈Br
E(Prtdb1 ,Artdb1 ,irtdb1 )u
∗
i (b1, Prtdb1 ,Artdb1 , irtdb1),
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where b1 is the block from which a consumer starts to search, i.e., k = 1. Note that consumer
i chooses an initial block b1 from the set of blocks in the region, Br, to maximize the expected
utility-to-go. The expectation is taken over the state variables (Prtdb1 ,Artdb1 , irtdb1), because they
are unknown at the time she makes the decision—consumer i only observes the realizations of these
random variables after she arrives at block b1.
In the first stage, consumer i chooses the option that brings her the highest expected utility
among uis, uig, and ui0, where
uis = max
b1∈Br
E(Prtdb1 ,Artdb1 ,irtdb1 )u
∗
i (b1, Prtdb1 ,Artdb1 , irtdb1),
uig = virtd + ig − ηid(b∗i , bg)− θiPbghi,
ui0 = i0.
Under the assumption of identical and rational beliefs across blocks, it is easy to see that consumer
i’s best starting location is her ideal location b∗i , because all blocks are ex-ante the same except
for their distances to the ideal location. Under the assumption of stratified beliefs across blocks,
however, consumers may not always choose their ideal locations to start their search. For example,
a consumer may want to start from a less congested block located far from her ideal location, if
she has a high search cost and a low distance disutility cost.
5. Identification and Estimation
Whether consumer i drives to the destination and where she eventually parks are determined by
her ideal location b∗i , trip valuation parameters α and β, search cost si, distance disutility ηi, price
sensitivity θi, and her utility and search cost shocks. Therefore, the primitives of the model that we
wish to estimate are: ideal location distribution ω∗rtd(b), trip valuation parameters α and β, the joint
distribution of (si, ηi, θi) and the standard deviation σ of the utility shocks. All parameters are
region specific. Observe that we cannot identify the ideal location distribution and the consumer
attributes jointly. To see this, imagine that we observe a uniform distribution of final parking
locations under congestion pricing. That could be because consumers’ ideal locations are largely
evenly distributed, or because consumers are very price sensitive and therefore reallocate them-
selves accordingly. Therefore, to be able to separately estimate the ideal location distribution and
the consumer attributes, we exploit observations of final parking locations both before and after
the implementation of congestion pricing. In particular, we highlight that consumers’ driving and
parking decisions observed under fixed pricing are pivotal to the separate identification of the ideal
location distribution and the consumer attributes. We discuss the identification and estimation of
the ideal location distribution and the consumer attributes in detail.
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5.1. Identification and Estimation of Ideal Location Distribution
5.1.1. Identification As mentioned above, consumers’ decision under fixed pricing enables
us to identify the ideal location distribution. In particular, under fixed pricing, a consumer will
always park if the block she arrives at is available—prices are fixed, so continuing to search does
not provide any benefit, but involves costs, leading to lower expected utility. This is in contrast to
the congestion pricing case in which a customer may decide to forego an available spot if the block
is too expensive.
Now imagine a hypothetical situation in which there are no capacity constraints at any block
(or, equivalently, that the constraints are never binding). Without capacity constraints, consumers
will always park at their ideal locations, making the consumer’s observed parking location precisely
her ideal location. Under the realistic situation of binding capacity constraints, however, lack of
space at the ideal location may force consumers to park in adjacent blocks or in a garage. That is,
in the presence of capacity constraints, the observed demand at a block could include consumers
whose ideal location is at that block as well as an overflow of consumers arriving from adjacent
blocks that are full. This allows us to generate moment conditions that equate the model-predicted
demand to the observed demand at each block.
Note, however, that this discussion only establishes the association of ideal and final parking
locations for those consumers who choose to drive. Our objective, however, is not to estimate the
ideal location distribution conditional on driving. To properly evaluate welfare changes and to
conduct counterfactual analyses, we need to estimate the unconditional ideal location distribution
of all Mr consumers in the market. To do so, we need to establish the conditions under which
a consumer chooses to drive and conditional on driving, whether she searches on-street or parks
directly in the garage. The fraction of consumers who drive depends on the expected congestion
level of a day—everything else equal, a consumer has a lower incentive to drive on a congested
day. Also, the fraction of consumers who search on-street is a function of the distance between the
ideal location and the garage—on a congested day, a consumer whose ideal location is closer to
the garage is more likely to go to the garage directly, compared to other consumers. If we knew
these fractions, we could rewrite the aforementioned moment conditions in terms of the uncondi-
tional ideal locations. Instead, we estimate these fractions non-parametrically using reduced-form
polynomial functions.
Once we estimate the ideal location distribution using the data from the before period, we use
it as an input in the after period. Therefore, in the after period, we only need to estimate the
consumer related parameters: trip valuation parameters, consumer attributes and the standard
deviation of the utility shocks. Note that for this method to work, we assume that while the number
of consumers who choose to drive may change, the unconditional ideal location distributions in
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the pre- and post-periods are the same for the same region, time and day. That is, the relative
popularity of an Apple store is the same on Monday mornings in April in both 2011 and 2012.
Though this assumption may not be perfect, it is reasonable, given that we have carefully chosen
the same study periods to mitigate the impact of seasonality, and we also distinguish morning,
noon, and afternoon, day of week and month in calculating these ideal location distributions. We
also conduct sensitivity analyses around the ideal locations by introducing varying levels of noises
to make sure that the results are robust to estimation errors in the ideal location distribution.
Refer to Appendix D.2 for details.
5.1.2. Estimation With the intuition in mind, we now describe the details of the estimation.
• Ideal Location Demand
Recall that there are Mr consumers in the market, among which Mrω
∗
rtd(b) consumers have
an ideal location of block b. Only a fraction of them will decide to drive and search for on-
street parking. This fraction depends on the relative utility of the outside option versus that of
driving and searching on-street. The fraction of consumers who choose to search for on-street
parking over the outside option is a function of the expected congestion level. Everything
else equal, the more congested the region is during time t on day d, the less likely it is that
a consumer will choose to search for on-street parking. This fraction also depends on the
relative utility of parking directly at the garage versus that of driving and searching on-street.
The fraction of consumers who choose to search for on-street parking over directly parking at
garage is a function of the distance between the garage and the ideal location. The further
away the garage is from the ideal location, the fewer consumers will choose to park directly
at the garage. In sum, the fraction of consumers who drive and search for on-street parking,
pi, is then a function of the expected availability, φrtd, and the distance between the garage
and the ideal location b, d(b, bg).
• Underlying Demand
Let q∗rtd(b) denote the underlying demand. The demand equals to the number of consumers
for which the ideal location is b and who decide to drive and search for on-street parking. We
then have:
q∗rtd(b) =Mr ·ω∗rtd(b) · pi(φrtd, d(b, bg))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fraction that drives
and searches on-street
. (1)
• Actual Demand
The actual demand for a block, denoted as qrtd(b), can then be written as the sum of q
∗
rtd(b)
and the overflow demand. The overflow demand comprises the consumers who are not able to
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find a parking spot at any nearby block. Let qoverflowrtd (b
′, b) denote the overflow demand from
block b′ to block b. We then have:
qrtd(b) = q
∗
rtd(b) +
∑
b′∈Brb
qoverflowrtd (b
′, b), (2)
• Overflow Demand
It is worthwhile to emphasize that the overflow demand from b′ to b includes not only con-
sumers whose ideal location is at adjacent blocks b′, but also b′’s overflow demand originating
from other blocks. Therefore, the overflow demand is defined recursively as a function of the
actual demand of adjacent blocks:
qoverflowrtd (b
′, b) = qrtd(b
′) · (1−φrtdb′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fraction that
cannot park at b′
·ρ(φrtd, d(b′, bg))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fraction that
continues searching
· 1|Brb′ | , (3)
where ρ denotes the fraction of consumers who will continue searching. Similarly to pi, the
fraction ρ is also a function of the expected availability, φrtd, and the distance of the garage
to the block under consideration, d(b′, bg).16 Recall that φrtdb′ is the availability of the specific
block b′, while φrtd is consumers’ belief of the availability of any block.
• Observed Demand
qobsrtd (b) = qrtd(b) ·φrtdb. (4)
Equations (1) to (4) can be simplified to one equation involving only the observed demand:
qobsrtd (b)
φrtdb
= Mrtd ·ω∗rtd(b) ·pi(φrtd, d(b, bg))
+
∑
b′∈Brb
qobsrtd (b
′) · 1−φrtdb′
φrtdb′
· ρ(φrtd, d(b′, bg)) · 1|Brb′ | . (5)
Note that the above equation should hold for all blocks in the region, i.e., ∀b ∈Br. We observe
both qobsrtd (b) and φrtdb from data. We need to estimate the ideal location distribution ω
∗
rtd(b) for all
b ∈ Br, and the functions pi(·) and ρ(·). We choose a flexible form to approximate pi(·) and ρ(·).
Specifically, we use the following second-order approximation:
pi(φrtd, d(b, bg)) ≈ γ0 + γ1φrtd + γ2d(b, bg) + γ3φrtdd(b, bg) + γ4φ2rtd + γ5d(b, bg)2,
ρ(φrtd, d(b, bg)) ≈ δ0 + δ1φrtd + δ2d(b, bg) + δ3φrtdd(b, bg) + δ4φ2rtd + δ5d(b, bg)2.
16 This is an approximation. More precisely, the fraction of consumers who continue searching depends on the difference
between the distance between the ideal location and the current block versus the distance between the ideal location
and the garage. Given a particular ideal location distribution, we approximate the fraction using a function of distance
between the garage and the current location and the expected availability. Based on geographical locations of all
blocks in each region, we calculate that the proxy has high correlations with the original variable, i.e., 0.95 to 0.96.
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We then estimate ω∗rtd(b), γ and δ based on the moment conditions specified in Equation (5)
using observations from region r, time t and day d. To illustrate that these parameters can be
identified, suppose that there are Nt hours in time window t, and Nd days in month m, then we have
Nt×Nd×|Br| observations to estimate |Br|−1 + 12 parameters. For example, if there are 3 hours
on a Monday morning, 4 Mondays in May, and 25 blocks in a region, we then have 3×4×25 = 300
observations to estimate 25− 1 + 12 = 36 parameters.17 Note that these polynomial functions are
used to estimate the unconditional distribution of ideal locations. The estimated coefficients in pi
and ρ are not used in the estimation of consumer attributes (e.g., search costs, disutility costs, and
price sensitivities), or in any counterfactual analysis. Rather, we derive the consumer equilibrium
decisions based on the model previously described.
Estimation of Availability. Recall that the availability of a block, φrtdb, is defined as the
probability of finding an available parking spot at block b in region r at time t on day d. Note that
even though we observe the utilization of a block (i.e., occupancy rate), ϕrtdb, from meter sensor
data, we do not directly observe the availability φrtdb. We derive availability φrtdb from observed
utilization by modeling the block as an M/G/srb/0 loss system. To explain, srb is the number of
servers, i.e., the number of parking spaces at block b. The number 0 indicates that it is a loss
system (the maximum length of the queue is zero), implying that consumers who find that the
block is full do not wait. Suppose the arrival rate to block b at time t on day d is λrtdb and that the
service rate is µrtdb. We assume that the arrival rate follows a Poisson process but that the time
spent parking can follow any distribution. According to the Erlang loss formula, the probability
that a consumer can successfully park, i.e., she is not ”lost”, is:
φrtdb = 1−
(
λrtdb
µrtdb
)srb
srb!
/ srb∑
k=0
(
λrtdb
µrtdb
)k
k!
(6)
Since only a fraction, φrtdb, of arriving consumers can be served, the utilization of the system is:
ϕrtdb =
φrtdbλrtdb
srbµrtdb
(7)
Rearrange and substitute Equation (6) back into Equation (7), then we can obtain φrtdb by solving:
φrtdb = 1−
(
ϕrtdbsrb
φrtdb
)srb
srb!
/ srb∑
k=0
(
ϕrtdbsrb
φrtdb
)k
k!
(8)
17 It is possible to do such calculations for all regions and verify that the parameters are identified for all regions.
Note that although the system of equations is identified, the day-of-week effect places restrictions on the number
of observations we can use to recover the ideal location distribution. To avoid overfitting, we have also tried an
alternative model where we incorporate a weekday versus weekend effect instead of the effect of each day separately.
The results are consistent. We do not include the demand at the garage as a moment condition because including it
would require another function to be estimated non-parametrically.
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Discussion. Finally, we discuss a potential limitation of this estimation of the ideal location
distribution, and how we address it. We make the assumption that because consumers always prefer
to park at their ideal location under the condition of equal prices in all blocks, they will always
check that ideal location first before searching further. However, some consumers may anticipate
congestion at the ideal location and park opportunistically on the way to the ideal location or
deliberately drive to a less congested area and park there. This possibility may induce errors in the
estimated ideal location distribution. Moreover, the polynomial approximation of pi and ρ functions
may also introduce estimation errors.
To ensure that our conclusions are not driven by such error sources, we conduct sensitivity
analyses to test the robustness of the results. Specifically, we conduct two sets of robustness tests.
In the first set of tests, we conduct sensitivity analyses around the ideal location distribution. We
introduce varying levels of noisy perturbations to the estimated ideal location distribution, and re-
estimate our model to see if the results are consistent under a different ideal location distribution.
The details are presented in Appendix D.2. In the second set of robustness tests, under various
ideal location distributions, we now allow consumers to start searching from locations other than
their ideal locations, based on the expected congestion levels of different blocks. We re-estimate
the model and re-calculate the welfare changes, and we find that the results are robust.
5.2. Identification and Estimation of Consumer Attributes
Now that we have exploited longitudinal variations in parking locations under fixed pricing to
estimate the ideal location distribution, we can separately identify consumer attributes exploiting
parking patterns under congestion pricing (assuming that the underlying ideal location distribution
does not change given the same region, time and day). The three key consumer attributes of
interest are: search cost, distance disutility, and price sensitivity. In this section, we first illustrate
the intuition behind the identification of these key parameters and then explain the estimation
procedures of these and other parameters in the model.
5.2.1. Identification In this subsection, we discuss the intuition behind the identification.
First, we would like to address a common question regarding identification of dynamic search
models: is it possible to identify search costs and other relevant parameters without observing indi-
viduals’ search paths? The answer to this question is yes. Indeed, there are studies that estimate
search related parameters in dynamic models without observing the actual search paths. For exam-
ple, Hortacsu and Syverson (2004) model how investors search over funds with varying attributes,
and estimate heterogeneous search costs using market share data and price data only. Hong and
Shum (2006) develop a method to uncover heterogeneous search costs using price data alone, using
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equilibrium conditions from sequential and non-sequential search models. Kim et al. (2010) esti-
mate consumer search costs in online retailing using view-rank data. As Hortacsu and Syverson
(2004) say, these papers demonstrate “how aggregate data can be used to identify and estimate
search costs separately from product differentiation, with particular attention to minimizing the
impact of functional form restrictions.” Other papers exploit the additional variations provided by
search paths to estimate search costs. For example, De Los Santos et al. (2012), Koulayev (2014)
and Chen and Yao (2016) all use consumer click stream data to estimate search costs.
Similar to Hortacsu and Syverson (2004), Hong and Shum (2006), and Kim et al. (2010), we
do not directly observe consumers’ search paths. However, our data is actually finer-grained than
theirs, because we observe each decision maker’s final decision, not just aggregate market shares
and prices. We now explain which variations in our data drive the identification of each parameter.
Separation of Price Sensitivity from Search Cost and Distance Disutility. Price sensi-
tivity (i.e., the distribution of θi) is identified through variations in parking locations when prices
vary. For illustration purposes, consider the simple case in Figure 1, where there is only one block b
and one garage g in the region. In this case, block b is the ideal location for all consumers, but some
will have to park at the garage on a congested day. What differentiates on-street versus off-street
parking is the parking fee and the distance disutility. Although the distance disutility is unchanged
before and after the implementation of congestion pricing, the parking fee changes. When the
on-street price increases following the implementation of congestion pricing, more consumers park
at the garage and fewer park on street, and vice versa. The extent to which price changes can
induce the reallocation of parking between on- and off-street identifies price sensitivity (relative to
distance disutility). Specifically, in Figure 1, consumers are more price-sensitive in Scenario 2 than
in Scenario 1, as more consumers reallocate in Scenario 2.
Figure 1 Identification Illustration: Separate Price Sensitivity from Distance Disutility
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Though a rather simplified case, what Figure 1 illustrates is that price sensitivity can be identified
from the redistribution of demand caused by congestion pricing. The same logic applies to a
more general case with multiple blocks in the region. For example, as Figure 2 demonstrates, the
redistribution of demand from the popular block b1 to other less popular blocks b2, b3, as well as
to the garage allow us to identify price sensitivity relative to search cost and distance disutility. A
higher price sensitivity relative to the other two parameters suggests that more consumers would
continue searching and park further away from the popular block seeking a lower parking price.
Consequently, this leads to a larger scale of reallocation of observed parking demand (i.e., Scenario
2 instead of Scenario 1).
Figure 2 Identification Illustration: Separate Price Sensitivity from Search Cost and Distance Disutility
Separation of Search Cost from Distance Disutility. There are two sources of variation
that separate search cost and distance disutility. The first is the extent to which parking demand
shifts to the garage rather than to nearby, less congested blocks. By choosing to park at the
garage, a consumer avoids additional search cost but usually incurs a greater walking distance
to her destination. By choosing to continue searching, a consumer will incur the search cost but
may reduce the walking distance if she finds a parking space nearby. Therefore, by observing that
parking demand shifts to the garage rather than to nearby less congested blocks, one can infer that
consumers are relatively more sensitive to the inconvenience induced by searching than walking.
Figure 3 illustrates the argument. In Scenario 2, more consumers shift their demand to the garage,
which is located farther away from the popular block b1, in response to a price increase at b1, than
to the nearby less congested block b2. Thus, consumers in Scenario 2 have a relatively higher search
cost and a lower distance disutility.
The second source of variation that separates search cost from distance disutility comes from
the fact that the incremental changes in search cost and respective incremental changes in walking
distance as the driver searches for parking do not correlate perfectly. If a consumer chooses to
continue searching, the total number of blocks searched always increases by one regardless of
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Figure 3 Identification Illustration: Separate Search Cost and Distance Disutility
which nearby block she visits next. But the walking distance from the next searched block to the
destination may increase or decrease depending on which way she turns (see Figure 4).18
Figure 4 Identification Illustration: Separate Search Cost and Distance Disutility
Note that this seemingly subtle variation comes from the fact that the search is conducted on
a two-dimensional space. If instead the search were conducted on a unidimensional line, then the
number of blocks searched would perfectly correlate with the distance from the ideal location, when
the consumer either moved toward or away from the ideal location. In this case, it would be more
difficult to determine whether a redistribution of demand is caused by aversion to search or by
aversion to walking.
18 In this figure, a consumer may turn left, right, or continue straight from the current block. If she turns left, she
is equally as far from her ideal location as she is now; while if she turns right or continues straight, she will be
one block farther from her ideal location. That is, the expected increase in distance if she continues searching is
( 1
3
× 2 + 1
3
× 3 + 1
3
× 3)− 2 = 2
3
, while the expected increase in the number of blocks searched is exactly 1.
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5.2.2. Estimation Given the ideal location distribution, the remaining parameters to be esti-
mated include: 1) the joint distribution of consumers’ search cost, distance disutility, and price
sensitivity, i.e., the joint distribution of (si, ηi, θi), 2) trip valuation parameters α and β, and 3)
the standard deviation of the utility shocks, σ. We assume that the joint distribution of (si, ηi, θi)
follows a multivariate lognormal distribution lnN(µs,η,θ,Ws,η,θ), where µ is the mean and W is
the variance-covariance matrix of the corresponding normal distribution. By estimating the joint
distribution, we allow a consumer’s search cost, distance disutility and price sensitivity to be cor-
related, and we estimate the correlations empirically. Let Θ = (µs,η,θ,Ws,η,θ, α,β,σ). Observe that
because the scale of utility is irrelevant to choices, not all parameters can be identified. We choose
to normalize µθ to 1, to conveniently measure welfare in dollar values later.
To estimate Θ, we use Simulated Method of Moments (SMM). SMM is conceptually identical
to the more commonly used Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), except that with SMM
the moments are calculated using model-based simulations rather than calculated directly from
the model. Researchers use SMM instead of GMM in cases where it is difficult (or impossible)
to derive moment conditions from the model directly. For example, in our setting it is impossible
to derive an explicit analytical form for the equilibrium. Therefore, we solve it numerically with
simulations. Specifically, given an admissible set of parameters Θ, we simulate the driving decision
and parking location for every consumer in the market. We then calculate the number of people
who park at each block and at the garage, as well as their total parking duration, and match
these to the corresponding moments observed in the data. Clearly, the moments calculated from
the simulation depend on the parameter Θ. If the model is correctly specified with Θ equal to its
true value, then the simulated moments will be the same as what we observe in the data. That is,
one can estimate Θ by minimizing the distance between the simulated moments and the observed
moments. In particular, we define the following notations:
• qobsrtd (b), qsimrtd (b;Θ): the number of consumers who park at block b at time t and day d in the
observed data and the simulated data, respectively.
• Qobsrtd(b),Qsimrtd (b;Θ): the total parking minutes at block b at time t and day d in the observed
data and the simulated data, respectively.
• qobsrtdg, qsimrtdg(Θ): the number of consumers who park at the garage at time t and day d in the
observed data and the simulated data, respectively.
• Qobsrtdg,Qsimrtdg(Θ): the total parking minutes at the garage at time t and day d in the observed
data and the simulated data, respectively.
The following moment conditions equalize the simulated moments to the observed moments:
m(Θ) =E
 q
obs
rtd (b)− qsimrtd (b;Θ),∀b, t, d
Qobsrtd(b)−Qsimrtd (b;Θ),∀b, t, d
qobsrtdg − qsimrtdg(Θ),∀t, d
Qobsrtdg −Qsimrtdg(Θ),∀t, d
= 0 (9)
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Solve for the parameters Θˆ that minimize the distance between the above (|B|+ 1)× 2 moment
conditions and the zero vector. Note that we match the simulated moments with the observed
moments in both the before (fixed pricing) and after (congestion pricing) periods. Appendix B
presents the details of how to calculate qsimrtd (b;Θ),Q
sim
rtd (b;Θ), q
sim
rtdg(Θ),Q
sim
rtdg(Θ).
6. Estimation Results, Welfare Analysis, and Robustness Tests
In this section, we report the estimated availability, ideal location distributions and model param-
eters. Based on the estimates, we then calculate welfare changes from before and after the imple-
mentation of congestion pricing. Lastly, we discuss the robustness tests to ensure that our results
are driven by data variations rather than by specific modeling assumptions.
6.1. Estimation Results
Availability. We calculate the real-time availability for each hour and each block in our sample
periods using the occupancy data reported by the parking sensors. Recall that we calculate avail-
ability based on the occupancy rates and the number of spaces in each block as shown in Equation
(8). Table 2 summarizes the availability estimates for high-, medium-, and low-utilization blocks
in each region during both before and after periods. We find that they exhibit similar patterns as
the occupancy rates shown in Table 1.
Ideal Location Demand. We estimate an ideal location distribution for each time window (i.e.,
morning, noon, afternoon) on each day of week (Monday to Saturday) for each month (May to July)
based on data observed for each corresponding time period, respectively, before the implementation
of congestion pricing.19 That is, for each region, we estimate a total of 3×6×3 = 54 ideal location
distributions. We report the summary statistics of these estimates in Table 3 and the detailed
estimates in Appendix C. In particular, we obtain an average R-square of 0.84, 0.73, and 0.60 for
Marina, Fillmore, and Mission, respectively.
Parameter Estimates. With the estimates of the ideal location distributions, assuming the
population’s ideal location distributions are the same for the respective time periods before and
after the implementation of congestion pricing, we can estimate the remaining model parameters
(see Table 4). Recall that the log scaled mean price sensitivity is normalized to one. Therefore,
we estimate the standard deviation of price sensitivity, the mean and standard deviation of the
per-block search cost, and the distance disutility. We also estimate the correlation matrix of price
sensitivity, search cost and distance disutility. Lastly, we estimate 11 parameters that affect trip
valuation.
19 While we also observe data from the last week of April, due to the small number of observations, we bundle the
observations in April together with May.
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To interpret the magnitudes, we convert the estimates of search cost, distance disutility and
average trip valuation into dollar values. In Marina, for example, we estimate that it costs consumers
approximately $0.39 to $2.82 to search an additional block and $1.10 to $4.58 to park one block
away from their destination, and that a trip is worth between -$1.61 and $7.89 to consumers
(all measured by first and third quartiles). The estimated parameter ranges are similar across all
regions.20
We also examine the estimated correlations between search cost, distance disutility and price
sensitivity. As expected, less price sensitive consumers also value their time more (we find negative
correlations between price sensitivity and search costs, and between price sensitivity and distance
disutility). Moreover, customers who dislike search also dislike parking farther away from their
destinations (there is a positive correlation between search cost and distance disutility).
Based on the estimated model, we calculate the average price elasticity (i.e., percentage change
in a block’s occupancy rate as a result of one percent change in its price) to be -0.88, -0.94 and
-0.64 for Marina, Fillmore and Mission, respectively. The estimates are of the same magnitude
as those reported in Pierce and Shoup (2013) and Ottosson et al. (2013), i.e., from -0.8 to -0.4.
Finally, to evaluate the model fit, we compare predicted and observed moments (i.e., number of
drivers and parking minutes) for each block (as in Hendel and Nevo 2006). Figure 13 demonstrates
a close moment fit by blocks. We also calculate the amount of variation in the observed moments
that can be explained by the model. At the hourly level, the model explains an average of 62% to
86% of the variations in the data.21
6.2. Welfare and Search Externality
Welfare. Using the model estimates, we quantify the effect of congestion pricing on both consumer
and social welfare. Denote the actual utility that consumer i obtains by uactli . Also let b
actl
i denote
the actual parking location for consumer i,
bactli =

b, if consumer i parks at block b eventually, b∈Br;
bg, if consumer i parks at the garage eventually;
o, if consumer i chooses the outside option eventually;
20 These interquartile ranges are for the entire population, which explain why some trip valuations are negative (lower
than the value of the outside option). For those consumers who choose to drive, the interquartile ranges for trip
valuations are between $2.04 and $12.45, $1.70 and $10.88, and $0.84 and $5.25 in Marina, Fillmore and Mission,
respectively.
21 We also conduct an in-sample and out-of-sample analysis by randomly selecting two-thirds of time and day in each
region to be used for the in-sample analysis and the remaining one third for out-of-sample analysis. The in-sample
R-squares are 79.3%, 87.4%, 62.8% for Marina, Fillmore and Mission, respectively, while the out-of-sample R-squares
are 71.9%, 87.9%, and 62.0% for each region, respectively.
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Let Ni denote the actual number of searches that consumer i has made. We have,
uactli =

virtd + is−Ni
(∑Ni
k=1 siirtdbk
)− ηid(b∗i , bactli )− θiPrtdbactli hi, if bactli = b, b∈Br;
uig −Ni
(∑Ni
k=1 siirtdbk
)
, if bactli = bg;
ui0−Ni
(∑Ni
k=1 siirtdbk
)
, if bactli = o.
We can then calculate consumer welfare, CW , and social welfare, SW , as follows:
CW =
Mr∑
i=1
1
θi
uactli ,
SW =CW +
Mr∑
i=1
Prtdbactli
hi.
Following the literature (see Meijer and Rouwendal 2006 and references therein), we divide utility
by price sensitivity θi such that welfare is expressed in dollar values. In calculating social welfare,
we treat parking payment as a transfer of income from consumers to the government, which is then
distributed back to the local community in various ways.22
The upper panel of Table 5 shows the total consumer and social welfare changes and the break-
down to the different elements that go into the calculation. Consumer welfare increases by $4.30
and $11.66 per a hundred consumers (or 5.6% and 14.6% of total payment) in Marina and Fill-
more, respectively, following the implementation of congestion pricing. However, consumer welfare
decreases by $5.06 per a hundred consumers (or 7.1% of total payment) in Mission. We observe
the same directional changes in social welfare.
Where do the welfare improvements originate from in Marina and Fillmore? In both regions,
following the implementation of congestion pricing, consumers incur lower search costs and lower
distance disutility. At the same time, more consumers find it attractive to drive to the destination
and hence the total trip valuation is higher. The gains from the reduced search costs and distance
disutility and the increased total trip valuation lead to higher social welfare. They also offset the
higher parking payments, leading to higher consumer welfare. The opposite occurs in the Mission
district. Following congestion pricing, both search costs and distance disutility increase, and the
total trip valuation decreases as the number of consumers who drive decreases. The overall effect is
that both social and consumer welfare decrease. The inconsistent welfare implications in different
regions highlight the critical tradeoff between utilization and congestion. From the perspective of
resource utilization, social planners would like to attract as many consumers as possible and keep
utilizations high. However, high utilization also generates congestion, which reduces the utility that
22 Due to lack of relevant data, this calculation of social welfare does not capture the potential indirect effects that
the program may have on society, such as changes in city traffic, pollution, and economics of local businesses.
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each consumer obtains from accessing the resource. We will examine why congestion pricing may
lead to lower welfare and which pricing policies may increase welfare in Mission in Section 7.1.
Search Externality. Even though we do not have data to measure the societal impact of
congestion pricing on other aspects such as local businesses, city traffic and pollution precisely, we
are able to examine its effect on search traffic, which we measure by the total number of blocks
searched. Surprisingly, despite the fact that congestion pricing leads to lower total search costs in
Marina and Fillmore, the changes in search traffic are negligible (see the lower panel of Table 5) (i.e.,
the total number of blocks searched does not change but the total search costs are lower, because
more consumers with lower search costs choose to search). Why does the total search traffic increase
despite having better availability following the implementation of congestion pricing? We find that
even though congestion pricing reduces the search for availability, it introduces another type of
search—the search for better prices, especially when prices are highly dispersed geographically.
In Marina and Fillmore, the price-based search exactly offsets the reduction in availability-based
search, leading to the same level of search traffic as before the implementation of congestion pricing,
while in the Mission, the total search traffic actually increases.
6.3. Robustness Tests
We conduct multiple robustness tests to ensure that our results are not driven by specific modeling
assumptions. In particular, we evaluate the robustness of our results along the following dimen-
sions: (1) Market size. To ensure that our results are not sensitive to the choice of market size, we
perform the analyses for multiple market sizes. The details and results are presented in Appendix
D.1. (2) Ideal location distribution. As discussed in Section 5.1.2, the ideal location distribu-
tion may contain estimation errors. To test robustness to such errors, we simulate different levels
of estimation errors through random perturbation, and then re-estimate the model parameters
and re-calculate the welfare changes. The details and results are presented in Appendix D.2. (3)
Consumers’ beliefs. Rather than assuming that consumers’ beliefs regarding availability and
price are identical across blocks at a given time and day in a region, we allow consumers to form
heterogeneous beliefs across blocks. That is, we assume that consumers distinguish between high-,
medium- and low-popularity blocks, and that they form separate beliefs for each type of block.
Under such beliefs, the estimated ideal location distribution is no longer accurate. We therefore
simulate ideal location distributions with different levels of estimation errors, and then re-estimate
the model parameters and re-calculate welfare changes under these consumer beliefs. The details
and results are presented in Appendix D.3. (4) Parking duration distribution. Due to the irreg-
ularities observed in the distribution of parking durations (details explained in Appendix B), we
draw parking durations from the observed empirical distribution. Note, however, that the observed
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distribution is censored, so that the underlying distribution can be different. To see whether cen-
soring may affect our conclusions, we simulate different distributions of parking durations based on
different censoring levels and introduce additional noises. We re-estimate the model and re-calculate
consumer and social welfare. Details and results are presented in Appendix D.4.
As shown in Figures 9 to 12, our conclusions regarding welfare and search traffic changes are
very robust to all these alternative modeling assumptions.
7. Counterfactual Analyses
We conduct three sets of counterfactual analyses. First, we examine which alternative pricing
policies may lead to welfare improvement for uncongested regions such as Mission. Second, we
examine simpler pricing structures to balance availability-based and price-based searching. Third,
we compare congestion pricing to a policy that puts a limit on parking duration, and evaluate
which policy is more efficient in allocating public parking resources.
7.1. Congestion Pricing in Uncongested Regions
Recall that the congestion pricing policy implemented by SFpark lowered consumer and social
welfare in Mission. A critical difference between Mission and the other two regions is that Mission
was not very congested even before the implementation. Before the SFpark program was imple-
mented, the average occupancy rate in Mission was 63%, as opposed to 75% and 72% in Marina
and Fillmore. Table 1 shows all blocks had occupancy rates below 80% during the before period,
i.e., April to July in 2011.23 We also find that occupancy rates are less dispersed geographically
in Mission as compared to the other regions implying that the primary goal for Mission is not to
reallocate demand across blocks, but to increase utilization. We therefore hypothesize that lower
parking rates may increase welfare in Mission, by increasing the fraction of consumers who drive
to the destination.
Specifically, we consider two counterfactuals with lower prices: (1) uniform pricing, where each
block is priced equally at a rate which is $0.50 lower than the average price charged during the
after period; (2) congestion pricing, in which each block is priced $0.50 lower compared to the
corresponding price during the after period for that block. We solve the new equilibrium following
procedures presented in Appendix E, with results shown in Table 6. We find that lowering parking
prices increases consumer and social welfare in both cases. Much of the gain can be attributed to
higher fractions of consumers driving to the destination, i.e., 54% as opposed to 50%. Even though
consumers incur slightly higher search costs or park farther away, the social gain from the increased
total trip valuation more than offsets losses in search costs and distance utility. Moreover, welfare
23 There were blocks with occupancy rates slightly above 80% in other months that year, which led to subsequent
price increases.
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differences between the two counterfactuals are negligible, confirming our intuition that when the
region is underutilized, demand reallocation is secondary to the benefit gained from increased
utilization. Although the counterfactuals do not necessarily point to the optimal pricing levels in
Mission, they illustrate that it is important to ascertain whether congestion is a real concern in the
region. If not, then alternative policies aimed at increasing utilization may lead to more desirable
outcomes.
7.2. Balance Availability-Based and Price-Based Searching
Recall that even though congestion pricing leads to higher consumer and social welfare in Marina
and Fillmore, it does not necessarily reduce search traffic. The reason is that although there is less
search for availability, consumers may also search for better prices, especially if prices are highly
dispersed and updated dynamically. To balance between better availability management and a
simpler price structure, we examine a pricing policy with only three price levels, each corresponding
to the high, medium, and low-utilization blocks, respectively. Given there are only three price
levels, we assume that consumers have perfect knowledge about each block’s price. To allow for a
fair comparison, we set each of the three price levels to equal the average price observed for high,
medium and low-utilization blocks, respectively. We keep the rate constant for the entire study
period regardless of the time of the day and day of week.
We solve for the equilibrium under the three-tier pricing policy. Note that given perfect knowledge
of prices, consumers may not start from the ideal locations and may choose at which block to
continue searching, instead of following a random walk strategy. The results, presented in Table
7, suggest that the simpler pricing policy achieves higher social and consumer welfare in all three
regions, compared to the more complex pricing policy currently in place. Much of this gain can be
attributed to lower search costs and lower payments.24 Moreover, the simpler pricing policy reduces
total search traffic by 30.7% and 7.4% in Marina and Fillmore, respectively, which is equivalent to
reductions of 9.2% and 2.2% in total traffic, assuming that search traffic represents roughly 30%
of all city traffic (Shoup 2006).
24 An alternative is to eliminate price search by providing full price information. In fact, the city has made price
information available through multiple channels. Unfortunately, consumers did not seem to be aware of or use such
information. Based on a survey conducted following the program, 81.8% of the 1584 respondents who parked on
street answered that they were unaware of the ways to get information to help them park. Even among those who
responded that they knew how to get this information, 83.6% responded that they either never or only rarely accessed
the information that were available on multiple channels, including 511.org phone and website, SFpark APP and
website and other. Therefore, we focus our counterfactual analysis on the simpler pricing policy rather than on the
complex pricing policy with complete price transparency. However, to get a sense of the relative welfare gains, we
have also analyzed the full information complex policy and found that the simpler pricing policy achieves at least
50% of the welfare gains that can be achieved by the complex policy with full price information. Details available
from the authors.
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7.3. Usage Limits versus Congestion Pricing
The regulation approach (e.g., usage limits or permits) and the market-based approach (e.g., price-
based approach) are the two most commonly used approaches in managing public resources. In city
parking, most local governments impose parking duration limits to regulate the usage of public
parking spaces, but some have recently used congestion pricing to match demand with limited
supply. For example, the City of San Francisco previously imposed 2-hour parking limits on most
blocks, but relaxed the limit to 4 hours when it decided to pilot the new congestion pricing program
in April 2011, (the start of the before period). To compare the two approaches, we examine the
counterfactual of uniform pricing with 2-hour parking limit. In this case, if a consumer wants to
park for more than the 2-hour limit, she has three options: she could either compromise and park
for up to 2 hours on street, park at the garage for the entire time demanded, or choose the outside
option.25 The results are presented in Table 8.
We find that social welfare is higher for all regions under congestion pricing compared to imposing
time limits. The results have an intuitive explanation. To maximize social welfare, a social planner
would allocate the parking spaces to consumers who value them the most. Congestion pricing aims
at doing exactly that—by charging different prices based on congestion levels, it gives the more
desired spots to customers who value them most (customers with higher trip valuation and lower
search costs, distance disutility and price sensitivity). The prices themselves are only a transfer,
so they do not affect social welfare calculations. In contrast, imposing limits on parking durations
makes consumers who want to park longer particularly worse off, because they are forced to park
for shorter time or seek alternative options. This is especially problematic if consumers’ valuations
for the trip are positively correlated with the length of the trip, implying that drivers who value
the trip more will likely be hurt the most. Therefore, congestion pricing leads to a more efficient
allocation compared to time limits, and we would expect social welfare to be higher with congestion
pricing compared to time limits.
The comparison of consumer welfare is less intuitive, because the prices charged affect consumer
welfare. There is a tradeoff from the perspective of consumer welfare: although congestion pricing
can allocate demand more efficiently, it usually does so by charging higher average prices; with the
time limit policy, prices are fixed, so it does not extract additional rents from consumers, but this
comes at the expense of a better allocation. Which effect dominates depends on many factors such
as the time limits imposed, the levels and spread of prices, and market and consumer characteristics.
Therefore, the overall effect on consumer welfare is ambiguous, as Table 8 illustrates.
25 Potentially, a customer can add more time after parking for 2 hours. However, “feeding the meter” (i.e., extending
the time beyond the legal limit) is illegal and may result in a citation, and is both inconvenient and costly for
consumers.
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It is worthwhile to note that prices charged by SFpark, as well as the time limits imposed, are
likely not the optimal ones. Still, the intuition described above likely holds. We expect that optimal
congestion pricing would lead to a more efficient allocation and result in a higher social welfare
compared to the optimal time limit.
8. Conclusion
Congestion pricing is often considered an effective tool to match supply with demand. Using data
from SFpark, we find evidence that congestion pricing helps to increase parking availability in
congested areas, reduces search costs, and allows consumers to park closer to their destinations
when they need to. These benefits outweigh the increased payments and lead to an overall increase
in consumer and social welfare.
Interestingly, we also find that congestion pricing can sometimes reduce consumer and social
welfare. This often happens in areas with relatively low congestion levels, where improving the
overall utilization by setting a proper price level is often more important than reallocating demand
by charging variable prices. Therefore, city governments should not apply congestion pricing blindly.
Rather, they should diagnose and address the primary concern of each region accordingly.
Our results also show that cities that consider implementing congestion pricing policies should
avoid setting unnecessarily complicated pricing rules. Even though congestion pricing is intended
to reduce search and traffic, it may introduce another type of search. If prices are dispersed geo-
graphically, consumers may choose to bypass available but expensive parking spots in hopes of
finding lower priced ones. Therefore, even though a more sophisticated pricing policy may result
in better availability across all blocks, it may not necessarily lead to reduced search and traffic
overall. To achieve the best welfare outcome, it is important to balance the desired availability
targets with the complexity of the pricing policy.
More generally, our learnings from SFpark also offer important lessons to other public sectors.
Both regulation-based and market-based approaches have been used in many public sectors, but
there remains a constant debate between them. We provide evidence that the market-based con-
gestion pricing approach generates higher social welfare than the regulation-based usage limit
approach. This is because congestion pricing tends to allocate resources to consumers who value
them the most, while usage limits may hurt these consumers more. Although policy decisions are
often multi-faceted and it is difficult to account for and measure all possible factors, our analysis
offers a generalizable methodology and quantifiable results that public sector managers can use to
better evaluate the tradeoffs involved.
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Figure 5 Smart Meters, Legacy Meters and SFpark Areas
04/11 08/11
Sample Period
Exclude for Seasonality
04/12 08/12 12/12
Battery Failure
08/13
Figure 6 Timeline
Feldman, Li and Tsai: Welfare Implications of Congestion Pricing: Evidence from SFpark
39
Figure 7 Snapshots of Fillmore
Table 1 Summary Statistics
Marina Fillmore Mission
Total High Mid Low Garage Total High Mid Low Garage Total High Mid Low Garage
Rate - before
2.00
(0.00)
2.00
(0.00)
2.00
(0.00)
2.00
(0.00)
2.50
(0.00)
2.00
(0.00)
2.00
(0.00)
2.00
(0.00)
2.00
(0.00)
2.00
(0.00)
2.00
(0.00)
-
2.00
(0.00)
2.00
(0.00)
2.00
(0.00)
Rate - after
2.36
(0.85)
3.24
(0.45)
2.51
(0.75)
1.00
(0.77)
1.72
(0.40)
2.23
(0.93)
3.21
(0.38)
2.02
(0.83)
1.41
(0.57)
2.22
(0.41)
2.29
(0.74)
-
2.46
(0.74)
1.97
(0.78)
2.00
(0.41)
Occupancy - before
0.75
(0.16)
0.83
(0.11)
0.75
(0.14)
0.56
(0.16)
0.13
(0.06)
0.72
(0.19)
0.85
(0.14)
0.69
(0.16)
0.56
(0.18)
0.26
(0.13)
0.63
(0.18)
-
0.65
(0.17)
0.56
(0.19)
0.12
(0.06)
Occupancy - after
0.74
(0.16)
0.81
(0.12)
0.74
(0.14)
0.57
(0.16)
0.19
(0.08)
0.70
(0.19)
0.81
(0.17)
0.67
(0.17)
0.58
(0.20)
0.23
(0.14)
0.69
(0.18)
-
0.70
(0.17)
0.64
(0.17)
0.12
(0.05)
Number of Blocks 19 6 10 3 1 45 13 25 7 1 25 0 6 19 2
Number of Spaces 319 95 162 62 205 714 93 483 138 920 261 0 173 88 448
* Standard deviations are in parentheses. High, medium and low utilization blocks are defined using average occupancy
rate greater than 80%, between 60% and 80%, and below 60%, respectively. When calculating the occupancy rate, we
excluded non-operational hours for parking spaces when applicable, for example, peak-time tow away zones. “Before”
refers to our sample period before congestion pricing: April to July in year 2011, “after” refers to our sample period after
congestion pricing: April to July in year 2012.
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Table 2 Summary of Availability Estimates
Marina Fillmore Mission
Total High Mid Low Garage Total High Mid Low Garage Total High Mid Low Garage
Availability - before
0.79
(0.27)
0.51
(0.32)
0.90
(0.13)
0.90
(0.18)
1.00
(0.00)
0.78
(0.25)
0.64
(0.31)
0.82
(0.19)
0.97
(0.07)
1.00
(0.00)
0.97
(0.06)
-
0.97
(0.06)
0.99
(0.05)
1.00
(0.00)
Availability - after
0.81
(0.26)
0.60
(0.33)
0.91
(0.14)
0.85
(0.23)
1.00
(0.00)
0.80
(0.25)
0.67
(0.32)
0.84
(0.18)
0.96
(0.06)
1.00
(0.00)
0.95
(0.12)
-
0.93
(0.11)
0.98
(0.74)
1.00
(0.00)
* Standard deviations are in parentheses. High, medium and low utilization blocks are defined using average occupancy
rate greater than 80%, between 60% and 80%, and below 60%, respectively. “Before” refers to our sample period before
congestion pricing: April to July in year 2011, “after” refers to our sample period after congestion pricing: April to July
in year 2012.
Table 3 Summary of Ideal Location Distribution Estimates
Marina Fillmore Mission
Mean (%) 5.21 2.19 4.00
Min (%) 1.09 0.19 1.49
Max (%) 14.81 7.19 7.95
# of Distribution Estimated 54 54 54
Average R-Sq 0.84 0.73 0.60
Table 4 Model Estimates
Marina Fillmore Mission Marina Fillmore Mission
Search cost (log-scaled) mean
0.05
(0.02)
0.12
(0.09)
0.14
(0.02)
Trip valuation - α
0.02
(0.24)
0.01
(0.25)
0.00
(0.16)
Search cost (log-scaled) sd
0.15
(0.05)
0.20
(0.15)
0.38
(0.29)
Trip valuation - intercept
4.44
(0.68)
3.10
(0.92)
1.69
(0.14)
Distance disutility (log-scaled) mean
0.81
(0.45)
0.50
(0.11)
0.48
(0.11)
Trip valuation - May Baseline
Distance disutility (log-scaled) sd
0.21
(0.16)
0.16
(0.06)
0.25
(0.14)
Trip valuation - June
-0.05
(0.29)
0.24
(0.12)
0.15
(0.44)
Price sensitivity (log scaled) mean Normalized to 1 Trip valuation - July
0.04
(0.25)
0.17
(0.40)
0.23
(0.36)
Price sensitivity (log-scaled) sd
0.63
(0.41)
0.58
(0.17)
0.46
(0.06)
Trip valuation - Monday Baseline
Error terms sd
6.83
(2.61)
5.70
(2.18)
3.94
(1.23)
Trip valuation - Tuesday
0.04
(0.06)
0.20
(0.24)
-0.17
(0.23)
Search cost×distance disutility corr 0.02
(0.22)
0.22
(0.46)
0.19
(0.14)
Trip valuation - Wednesday
0.12
(0.14)
0.12
(0.26)
0.18
(0.23)
Search cost×price sensitivity corr -0.30
(0.52)
-0.37
(0.32)
-0.19
(0.05)
Trip valuation - Thursday
0.12
(0.12)
0.16
(0.26)
0.10
(0.24)
Distance disutility× price sensitivity corr -0.27
(0.19)
-0.35
(0.18)
-0.16
(0.23)
Trip valuation - Friday
0.07
(0.11)
0.19
(0.19)
-0.19
(0.23)
Search cost dollar value? [$0.39, $2.82] [$0.39, $3.33] [$0.46, $2.87] Trip valuation - Saturday
0.03
(0.12)
-0.16
(0.11)
0.04
(0.22)
Distance disutility dollar value [$1.10, $4.58] [$0.73, $3.76] [$0.92, $2.81] Trip valuation - morning Baseline
Trip valuation dollar value [-$1.61, $7.89] [-$1.23, $6.82] [$0.59, $3.72] Trip valuation - noon
0.42
(0.21)
0.34
(0.14)
0.86
(0.41)
Trip valuation - afternoon
0.02
(0.03)
0.57
(0.38)
0.68
(0.05)
* The dollar value interval displays the first and the third quartiles of the distribution over commuters.
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Table 5 Welfare and Search Externality
Panel A: Welfare Calculations
Marina Fillmore Mission
Before After Before After Before After
Search Cost 34.76 29.74 54.39 42.28 4.77 6.50
Distance Disutility 40.49 30.42 37.46 30.34 4.03 6.17
Payment 76.65 93.3 80.06 90.52 71.57 71.61
Trip Valuation 677.57 683.43 590.29 593.20 287.52 286.37
Consumer Welfare Change 4.30 11.66 -5.06
Social Welfare Change 20.95 22.12 -5.02
Panel B: Summary Statistics of Consumer Actions and Search Traffic
Go with the Car (%) 49.97 52.53 49.99 51.52 50.21 49.71
Park at Garage (%) 2.33 2.51 12.49 13.10 2.44 2.54
Search on Availability (%) 16.76 14.96 15.87 13.95 1.75 1.72
Search on Price(%) 0.00 2.05 0.00 2.14 0.00 0.36
# of Searches 20.85 20.90 21.47 21.62 1.89 2.28
* Consumer welfare is normalized to dollar value at the size of a hundred commuters. Results are based on 50 rounds of
simulations.
Table 6 Welfare and Search Externality with Lowering Prices Uniformly by $0.5
Panel A: Welfare Calculations
Before
(Uniform Pricing)
After
(SFpark Pricing)
Counterfactual I
(Uniform pricing $0.5 lower)
Counterfactual II
(SFpark Pricing $0.5 lower)
Search Cost 4.77 6.5 6.67 6.82
Distance Disutility 4.03 6.17 4.94 5.04
Payment 71.57 71.61 61.19 61.16
Trip Valuation 287.52 286.37 293.98 293.88
Consumer Welfare Change -5.06 14.03 13.71
Social Welfare Change -5.02 3.65 3.30
Panel B: Summary Statistics of Consumer Actions and Search Traffic
Go with the Car (%) 50.21 49.71 54.19 54.22
Park at Garage (%) 1.75 1.72 2.00 2.15
Search Availability (%) 0.00 0.36 2.30 2.23
Search Price (%) 1.89 2.28 0.00 0.06
Total # of Searches 2.44 2.54 2.67 2.71
* Consumer welfare is normalized to dollar value at the size of a hundred commuters. Results are based on 50
rounds of simulations.
Table 7 Welfare and Search Externality with Three-Tier Pricing
Panel A: Welfare Calculations
Marina Fillmore Mission
Before
(Uniform Pricing)
After
(SFpark Pricing)
Counterfactual
(3-Tier Pricing)
Before
(Uniform Pricing)
After
(SFpark Pricing)
Counterfactual
(3-Tier Pricing)
Before
(Uniform Pricing)
After
(SFpark Pricing)
Counterfactual
(3-Tier Pricing)
Search Cost 34.76 29.74 26 54.39 42.28 40.27 4.77 6.5 4.75
Distance Disutility 40.49 30.42 33.27 37.46 30.34 32.8 4.03 6.17 5.09
Payment 76.65 93.3 78.51 80.06 90.52 81.48 71.57 71.61 73.2
Trip Valuation 677.57 683.43 682.92 590.29 593.18 594.45 287.52 286.37 286.84
Consumer Welfare Change 4.30 19.47 11.66 21.52 -5.06 -3.35
Social Welfare Change 20.95 21.33 22.12 22.94 -5.02 -1.72
Panel B: Summary Statistics of Consumer Actions and Search Traffic
Go with the Car (%) 49.97 52.53 51.72 49.99 51.52 51.59 50.21 49.71 49.83
Park at Garage (%) 2.33 2.51 2.56 12.49 13.10 13.55 2.44 2.54 2.43
Search Availability (%) 16.76 14.96 12.56 15.87 13.95 11.96 1.75 1.72 1.73
Search Price (%) 0.00 2.05 0.00 0.00 2.14 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.00
Total # of Searches 20.85 20.90 14.44 21.47 21.62 19.89 1.89 2.28 1.87
* Consumer welfare is normalized to dollar value at the size of a hundred commuters. Results are based on 50 rounds of
simulations.
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Table 8 Welfare and Search Externality with 2-hour Usage Limit
Panel A: Welfare Calculations
Marina Fillmore Mission
Before
(Uniform Pricing)
After
(SFpark Pricing)
Counterfactual
(2-hour limit+
uniform pricing)
Before
(Uniform Pricing)
After
(SFpark Pricing)
Counterfactual
(2-hour limit+
uniform pricing)
Before
(Uniform Pricing)
After
(SFpark Pricing)
Counterfactual
(2-hour limit+
uniform pricing)
Search Cost 34.76 29.74 28.53 54.39 42.28 45.93 4.77 6.5 4.73
Distance Disutility 40.49 30.42 34.04 37.46 30.34 32.94 4.03 6.17 5.64
Payment 76.65 93.3 72.04 80.06 90.52 76.62 71.57 71.61 66.93
Trip Valuation 677.57 683.43 667.01 590.29 593.18 582.11 287.52 286.37 279.64
Consumer Welfare Change 4.30 6.73 11.66 8.24 -5.06 -4.81
Social Welfare Change 20.95 2.12 22.12 4.80 -5.02 -9.45
Panel B: Summary Statistics of Consumer Actions and Search Traffic
Go with the Car (%) 49.97 52.53 51.51 49.99 51.52 50.47 50.21 49.71 50.15
Park at Garage (%) 2.33 2.51 2.77 12.49 13.10 13.75 2.44 2.54 2.54
Search Availability (%) 16.76 14.96 14.17 15.87 13.95 13.18 1.75 1.72 1.74
Search Price (%) 0.00 2.05 0.00 0.00 2.14 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.00
Total # of Searches 20.85 20.90 16.64 21.47 21.62 16.63 1.89 2.28 1.90
* Consumer welfare is normalized to dollar value at the size of a hundred commuters. Results are based on 50 rounds of
simulations.
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Appendix A: Calculation of The Value of Continued Search
In this section, we show how V searchi (bk) can be calculated recursively. Under the assumption that consumer
beliefs of (Prtdbk ,Artdbk) are i.i.d. across blocks, we can write the expected value of a consumer from continuing
to search:
V searchi (bk) = E
[
max
a={0,1,2}
ui(bk+1, Prtdbk+1 ,Artdbk+1 , irtdbk+1 ;a)|(bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk , irtdbk)
]
= E
[
max
a={0,1,2}
ui(bk+1, Prtdbk+1 ,Artdbk+1 , irtdbk+1 ;a)|bk
]
= E
[
E(Prtdbk+1 ,Artdbk+1 ,irtdbk+1 )
[
max
a={0,1,2}
ui(bk+1, Prtdbk+1 ,Artdbk+1 , irtdbk+1 ;a)|(bk+1, bk)
]]
=
1
|Brbk |
∑
bk+1∈Brbk
[∫∫∫ [
max
a={0,1,2}
ui(bk+1, Prtdbk+1 ,Artdbk+1 , irtdbk+1 ;a)
·fP,Artd (Prtdbk+1 ,Artdbk+1)f rtd(irtdbk+1)dPrtdbk+1dArtdbk+1dirtdbk+1
]
=
1
|Brbk |
∑
bk+1∈Brbk
[
φrtd
∫∫
max
a={0,1,2}
ui(bk+1, P,1, ;a)f
P |A
rtd (P |A= 1)f rtd()dPd
+ (1−φrtd)
∫∫
max
a={0,1,2}
ui(bk+1, P,0, ;a)f
P |A
rtd (P |A= 0)f rtd()dPd
]
(10)
The first double integral in the brackets represents the expected value-to-go if the next block is available,
i.e., Artdbk+1 = 1. The second double integral in the brackets represents the expected value-to-go if the next
block is unavailable, i.e., Artdbk+1 = 0. The function f
P |A
rtd denotes the density function of price conditional
on availability. We expand these two double integrals further:∫∫
max
a={0,1,2}
ui(bk+1, P,1, ;a)f
P |A
rtd (P |A= 1)f rtd()dPd
=
∫
≤V
search
i
(bk+1)−V
garage|o
i
si
(
− si+V searchi (bk+1)
)
· F¯P |Artd
(
si−V searchi (bk+1) + vrtd + irtd− ηid(b∗i , bk+1)
θihi
|A= 1
)
f rtd()d
+
∫
P≤ vrtd+irtd−ηid(b
∗
i
,bk+1)−V
garage|o
i
θihi
V parki (bk+1, P )F¯

rtd
(
V searchi (bk+1)−V parki (bk+1, P )
si
)
fP |Artd (P |A= 1)dP
+ V garage|oi F¯
P |A
rtd
(
vrtd + irtd− ηid(b∗i , bk+1)−V garage|oi
θihi
|A= 1
)
F¯ rtd
(
V searchi (bk+1)−V garage|oi
si
)
, (11)
where F rtd() is the CDF of , F
P |A
rtd (P |A) is the conditional CDF of P , F¯ rtd() = 1−F rtd() and F¯P |Artd (P |A) =
1−FP |Artd (P |A). And
∫∫
max
a={0,1,2}
ui(b,P,0, ;a)f
P |A
rtd (Prtdbk+1 |A= 0)f rtd()dPd
=
∫
<
V search
i
(bk+1)−V
garage|o
i
si
(
− si+V searchi (bk+1)
)
f rtd()d
+ V garage|oi F¯

rtd
(
V searchi (bk+1)−V garage|oi
si
)
(12)
In sum, we see that the value V searchi (bk) is a function of the expected values to continue searching from
the adjacent blocks, V searchi (bk+1), the expected value of parking at the adjacent blocks, V
park
i (bk+1, P ),
Feldman, Li and Tsai: Welfare Implications of Congestion Pricing: Evidence from SFpark
44
and the values to stop searching V garage|oi .
26 Note that Equations (10), (11), and (12) are derived under
the assumption that consumer beliefs are identical across blocks. For the version of the model in which we
assume that consumers can distinguish between high-, medium- and low-popularity blocks, we re-derive these
calculations. The derivations and results of the alternative model are shown in Appendix D.3.
Appendix B: Simulated Methods of Moments Estimation Procedure
In this section, we provide the detailed steps of implementing Simulated Methods of Moments Estimation.
• Step 1: Solve the Model
Given a set of parameters Θ and simulated shocks, we solve for the decision of each consumer: whether
she drives, and if so, where she parks.
1. For each consumer i in region r at time t on day d, draw the ideal location b∗i from the ideal
location distribution ω∗rtd(b), b ∈ Br. Draw a search cost, distance disutility and price sensitivity
(si, ηi, θi) from the multivariate lognormal distribution lnN(µs,η,θ,Ws,η,θ). Finally, we need a draw
of parking duration hi. Observe from Figure 14 that the distribution of parking duration does not
fit common distributions such as normal, lognormal or extreme value. Rather, there are often spikes
at 30-minute, 1-hour, 2-hour, 3-hour, and 4-hour marks. Therefore, estimating the distribution of
parking duration assuming it follows certain distribution is problematic. Instead, we draw parking
durations from the empirical distribution and conduct sensitivity analyses around it. The details
are discussed in Appendix D.4.
2. Simulate the random utility shocks i0, ig, is from i.i.d normal distributions with mean 0 and
standard deviation σ. Also simulate a sequence of search cost shocks irtdbk , k= 1,2,3, ... from the
standard log normal distribution.
3. Calculate the utility of the outside option, ui0, the utility of parking at the garage, uig, and the
utility of driving and starting searching on street, uis. While it is straightforward to calculate the
first two utilities, to calculate uis, we first need to solve the dynamic search model. We explain the
details below.
4. At each step of the dynamic search, the consumer can choose whether to park at the current
block, continue to search or abandon searching. Given the ideal location, the parameters, and the
simulated shocks, it is straightforward to calculate the utility from parking at the current block
and from giving up search. However, to calculate the expected utility from continuing to search,
V searchi (bk), we need to solve Equation (10) recursively. Observe from Equations (10), (11) and
(12), that V searchi (bk) is a function of the expected utility from continuing to search at each of the
nearby blocks, V searchi (bk+1), where bk+1 ∈Bbrk . That is, it is possible to solve for the fixed point
of the vector V searchi (b) using the system of |Br| equations. Note that φrtd and the conditional
26 When a customer arrives at a boundary of a region, we allow her to drive outside the boundary, in which case
we will no longer observe her in the data. We approximate the value of driving outside the boundary based on the
utility obtained from parking at a block at $2 per hour (i.e., parking price at legacy meters). We also assume that
the distance of a block located outside the boundary to the ideal location is (at least) one block larger compared to
the distance between the boundary and ideal locations.
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distribution fP |Artd are calculated based on observations in the data under the rational expectation
assumption. In the counterfactual analyses, however, we calculate new equilibrium distributions
following the procedure outlined in Appendix E. Once we calculate the utility from continuing
to search, we solve for the optimal decision at each step according to the optimal decision rule.
Finally, we calculate the expected utility of a consumer who chooses to drive and start searching
on street, uis.
5. Determine whether a consumer decides to drive and, if so, whether she starts searching on street
or parks at the garage directly.
6. Repeat these steps for all Mr consumers in the region at time t on day d.
7. Repeat these steps for all times and days in all regions.
• Step 2: Calculate Simulated Moments Based on the simulation, for each region, time and day,
calculate 1) the number of consumers who choose to drive and end up parking at each block, 2) the
number of consumers who choose to drive and end up parking at the garage, 3) the total minutes parked
at each block, and 4) the total minutes parked at the garage.
• Step 3: Match Simulated Moments to Observed Moments Solve the moment conditions in
Equation (9) to obtain the parameter estimates Θˆ.
Appendix C: Ideal Location Estimation
Figure 8 shows the detailed estimates of the ideal location distributions. Recall that we estimate the ideal
location distribution for each region, time window (i.e., morning, noon, afternoon), day of week (i.e., Monday
to Saturday) and month separately. Since the estimates are very similar across months, for brevity, we report
the average of the estimates across months. In addition, we shows the estimates of the parameters in the
approximation functions pi and ρ in Table 9.
Appendix D: Robustness Tests
We evaluate the robustness of our model along the following dimensions:
D.1. Market Size
In the baseline model, we set the market size to be twice the average number of drivers in the before period,
which yields a market size of 700 in Marina, 1135 in Fillmore and 1420 in Mission. We perform the sensitivity
analysis by choosing different levels of market size, which are 1.5, 2.5 and 3.0 times the average number
of drivers in the before period. This choice rule yields market sizes of 525, 875 and 1050 for Marina, 850,
1420 and 1700 for Fillmore, and 1065, 1775 and 2130 for Mission. Results in Figure 9 shows that changes in
consumer welfare, social welfare and search traffic are robust to the choice of market size.
D.2. Ideal Location Estimation Errors
To make sure that our results are robust to estimation errors in ideal location distributions, we introduce
several levels of noise to the existing ideal location distribution estimates, and we re-estimate consumer
attributes and re-calculate welfare and search traffic. We follow the perturbation procedure below to intro-
duce different levels of noises. Let ωˆrtd(b), b= 1,2, ..., |Br − 1| denote the vector of estimated ideal location
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distribution for region r at time t on day d, and ω′rtd(b), b = 1,2, ..., |Br − 1| denote the new ideal location
distribution after perturbation.
ω′rtd(b) = max
(
ωˆrtd(b) + τεrtd(b),0
)
, b= 1,2, ..., |Br − 1|,
where εrtd(b) is a random draw from a standard normal distribution, and τ is a scaling factor. Specifically,
we set τ = 1%,3%,5% to vary the level of noises introduced. Note that the maximum is taken to ensure that
the fraction of consumers whose ideal location is at a specific block is non-negative. Lastly, we also make sure
that the new ideal location distribution vector thus obtained satisfies
∑|Br−1|
b=1 ω
′
rtd(b)≤ 1,∀r, t, d. If not, we
redraw the error vector εrtd(b), b= 1,2, ..., |Br − 1|. To get a sense of how much noise we introduce through
this perturbation procedure, we calculate the noise to signal ratio defined as
∑
b |τεrtd(b)|∑
b ωˆrtd(b)
, which ranges from
0.15–0.78 for Marina, 0.36–1.78 for Fillmore, and 0.20–0.98 for Mission.
The results in Figure 10 demonstrate that our conclusions regarding changes in consumer welfare, social
welfare and search traffic remain unchanged.
D.3. Consumer Beliefs
We now allow consumers to form different beliefs of price and availability for high-, medium- and low-
popularity blocks, {PHrtd,AHrtd},{PMrtd,AMrtd},{PLrtd,ALrtd}. We also assume that consumers know which block
is high-, medium-, and low-popularity block. Under such assumptions, consumers’ decisions differ from those
derived under identical beliefs in two ways. First, consumers may choose to start their search from a block
that is not their destination given their knowledge of all blocks’ popularity. Second, consumers will derive
an optimal search path instead of following a random walk strategy at the intersection: they choose where
to go next based on which block yields the highest expected utility. We now derive the transition probability
and the optimal decision rule under such assumptions.
Let b∗k+1(bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk , irtdbk) denote the block that consumer i will visit if she chooses to continue
searching after block bk. Let Ub = {H,M,L} denote the popularity level of block b. We can now write down
the transition probability:
Pr
(
bk+1, Prtdbk+1 ,Artdbk+1 , rtdbk+1 ; 0|bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk , irtdbk
)
=
{
f
P,A|Ubk+1
rtdb
(
Prtdbk+1 ,Artdbk+1 |bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk
)
f (irtdbk+1), if bk+1 = b
∗
k+1(bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk , irtdbk),
0, otherwise,
where fP,A|Urtdb is the joint density function of P,A for block type U . Under the assumptions that consumers
form rational expectations for each block type and that consumers do not update their beliefs, the value of
continued search can be simplified as:
V searchi (bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk , irtdbk)
= E
[
max
a={0,1,2},bk+1∈Brbk
ui(bk+1, Prtdbk+1 ,Artdbk+1 , rtdbk+1 ;a)|(bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk , rtdbk)
]
= max
bk+1∈Brbk
E
[
max
a={0,1,2}
ui(bk+1, Prtdbk+1 ,Artdbk+1 , rtdbk+1 ;a)|(bk+1, bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk , rtdbk)
]
= max
bk+1∈Brbk
E
[
max
a={0,1,2}
ui(bk+1, Prtdbk+1 ,Artdbk+1 , rtdbk+1 ;a)|(bk+1, bk)
]
≡ max
bk+1∈Brbk
V searchi (bk+1, bk)
≡ V searchi (bk). (13)
Feldman, Li and Tsai: Welfare Implications of Congestion Pricing: Evidence from SFpark
47
Optimal Decision Rule. Note that the optimal decision rule now concerns two decisions; (1) whether
to park, continue searching or stop searching, and (2) which block to search next if the search continues.
For consumer i, the optimal decision rule {a∗i (bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk , irtdbk), b∗k+1(bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk , irtdbk)} can be
characterized as follows.
If consumer i decides to continue searching, she will drive to block b∗k+1(bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk , irtdbk) such that:
b∗k+1(bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk , irtdbk)
= arg max
bk+1∈Brbk
E
[
max
a={0,1,2}
ui(bk+1, Prtdbk+1 ,Artdbk+1 , rtdbk+1 ;a)|(bk+1, bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk , rtdbk)
]
= arg max
bk+1∈Brbk
E
[
max
a={0,1,2}
ui(bk+1, Prtdbk+1 ,Artdbk+1 , rtdbk+1 ;a)|(bk+1, bk)
]
= arg max
bk+1∈Brbk
E
[
max
a={0,1,2}
ui(bk+1, Prtdbk+1 ,Artdbk+1 , rtdbk+1 ;a)|bk
]
The optimal decision a∗i (bk, Prtdbk ,Artdbk) can be characterized similarly as before:
• When the current block is available, i.e., Artdbk = 1, a consumer will choose the action that gives her
the highest utility:
a∗i (bk, Prtdbk ,1, irtdbk)
=

0, if − siirtdbk +V searchi (bk)>max
(
V garage|oi , V
park
i (bk, Prtdbk)
)
1, if V parki (bk, Prtdbk)≥max
(
V garage|oi ,−siirtdbk +V searchi (bk)
)
2, otherwise.
• When the current block is unavailable, i.e., Artdbk = 0,
a∗i (bk, Prtdbk ,0, irtdbk) =
{
0, if − siirtdbk +V searchi (bk)>V garage|oi
2, otherwise.
Note that V searchi (bk) is defined by Equation (13). We now show how it can be calculated recursively.
V searchi (bk) = max
bk+1∈Brbk
E
[
max
a={0,1,2}
ui(bk+1, Prtdbk+1 ,Artdbk+1 , rtdbk+1 ;a)|(bk+1, bk)
]
= max
bk+1∈Brbk
[∫∫∫ [
max
a={0,1,2}
ui(bk+1, P
Ubk+1
rtd ,A
Ubk+1
rtd , irtdbk+1 ;a)
·fP,A|Ubk+1rtd (P
Ubk+1
rtd ,A
Ubk+1
rtd )f

rtd(irtdbk+1)dP
Ubk+1
rtd dA
Ubk+1
rtd dirtdbk+1
]
= max
bk+1∈Brbk
[
φ
Ubk+1
rtd
∫∫
max
a={0,1,2}
ui(bk+1, P,1, ;a)f
P |A,Ubk+1
rtd (P |AUbk+1 = 1)f rtd()dPd
+ (1−φUbk+1rtd )
∫∫
max
a={0,1,2}
ui(bk+1, P,0, ;a)f
P |A,Ubk+1
rtd (P |AUbk+1 = 0)f rtd()dPd
]
, (14)
where φUrtd denotes consumers’ belief of availability for blocks of type U,U = {H,M,L}. Under the ratio-
nal expectation assumption, we have φUrtd =
∑
b∈BUr
φrtdb
|BUr |
, where BUr ,U = {H,M,L} denote the set of high-,
medium, and low-popularity blocks in region r.
We can further expand the first double integral in Equation (14) as follows:∫∫
max
a={0,1,2}
ui(bk+1, P
Ubk+1 ,1, ;a)f
P |A,Ubk+1
rtd (P |AUbk+1 = 1)f rtd()dPd
=
∫
≤V
search
i
(bk+1)−V
garage|o
i
si
(
− si+V searchi (bk+1)
)
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· F¯P |A,Ubk+1rtd
(
si−V searchi (bk+1) + vrtd + irtd− ηid(b∗i , bk+1)
θihi
|AUbk+1 = 1
)
f rtd()d
+
∫
P
Ubk+1≤
vrtd+irtd−ηid(b∗i ,b∗k+1)−V
garage|o
i
θihi
V parki (b
∗
k+1, P
Ubk+1 )
· F¯ rtd
(
V searchi (bk+1)−V parki (b∗k+1, PUbk+1 )
si
)
f
P |A,Ubk+1
rtd (P |AUbk+1 = 1)dP
+ V garage|oi F¯
P |A,Ubk+1
rtd
(
vrtd + irtd− ηid(b∗i , b∗k+1)−V garage|oi
θihi
|AUbk+1 = 1
)
· F¯ rtd
(
V searchi (bk+1)−V garage|oi
si
)
, (15)
where F rtd() is the CDF of , F
P |A,U
rtd (P |A) is the conditional CDF of P for block type U , F¯ rtd() = 1−F rtd()
and F¯
P |A,Ubk+1
rtd (P |AUbk+1 ) = 1−F
P |A,Ubk+1
rtd (P |AUbk+1 ).
We can expand the second double integral in Equation (14) as follows:∫∫
max
a={0,1,2}
ui(bk+1, P,0, ;a)f
P |A,Ubk=1
rtd (P |AUbk+1 = 0)f rtd()dPd
=
∫
<
V search
i
(bk+1)−V
garage|o
i
si
(
− si
+ V searchi (bk+1)
)
f rtd()d+V
garage|o
i F¯

rtd
(
V searchi (bk+1)−V garage|oi
si
)
(16)
We can see that the value V searchi (bk) is a function of the expected values to continue searching from the
adjacent blocks, which allows us to calculate V searchi (bk) by solving the equation recursively.
D.4. Parking Duration
To make sure that our approach of drawing the parking durations from the censored empirical distribution
is not restrictive, we draw different sets of parking time distributions, which contain different proportions of
short and long parking durations such as those shown in Figure 14. Specifically, we draw from the following
sets of parking time distributions, which preserve the general shape of the empirical density function of
parking durations:
1. The parking time distribution conditional on congestion being low, with 10% more weight for parking
durations that are less than 1-hour.
2. The parking time distribution conditional on congestion being low.
3. The parking time distribution conditional on congestion being medium.
4. The parking time distribution conditional on congestion being high.
5. The parking time distribution conditional on congestion being high, with 10% less weight for parking
durations that are less than 1-hour.
We re-estimate the model and re-calculate the counterfactual equilibrium. The results are displayed in Figure
12, and the changes in consumer welfare, social welfare and search traffic are very robust to the different
parking duration distributions used.
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Appendix E: Algorithm for Computing the Counterfactual Equilibrium
In the counterfactual analysis, we compute the counterfactual equilibrium following the procedure below:
1. For each region r, time t and day d, start with an initial guess of each consumer’s driving and parking
decision. Compute the number of consumers parking at each block, qrtd(b),∀b ∈ Br, and the total
parking minutes at each block, Qrtd(b),∀b∈Br. Also compute the number of consumers parking at the
garage, qrtdg, and the total minutes parked, Qrtdg.
2. Calculate the occupancy rate at each block for region r, time t and day d. Then compute the availability
at each block φˆrtdb,∀b∈Br by solving Equation (8).
3. Given the estimated parameters and the availability vector φˆrtdb,∀b ∈ Br, re-calculate each con-
sumer’s driving and parking decision based on the optimal decision rule derived in the paper. Update
q′rtd(b),Q′rtd(b),∀b∈Br, q′rtdg, and Q′rtdg.
4. Repeat the above steps until convergence, i.e.,
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
q′rtd(b)− qrtd(b),∀b
Q′rtd(b)−Qrtd(b),∀b
q′rtdg − qrtdg,
Q′rtdg −Qrtdg
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ < = 10−4.
5. Repeat the above steps to obtain the equilibrium parking locations for all regions, times and days.
Marina: 9am - 11am Marina: 12pm - 2pm Marina: 3pm - 5pm
Fillmore: 9am - 11am Fillmore: 12pm - 2pm Fillmore: 3pm - 5pm
Mission: 9am - 11am Mission: 12pm - 2pm Mission: 3pm - 5pm
Figure 8 Ideal Location Demand Estimates
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Figure 9 Robustness Test: Market Size
Figure 10 Robustness Test: Ideal Location
Figure 11 Robustness Test: Consumer Belief
Figure 12 Robustness Test: Parking Duration
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Table 9 Estimates of γ and δ
9am - 11am 12pm - 2pm 3pm - 5pm
Mon. Tues. Wed. Thur. Fri. Sat. Mon. Tues. Wed. Thur. Fri. Sat. Mon. Tues. Wed. Thur. Fri. Sat.
Marina
γ0 -1.13 -1.49 -0.59 -1.15 -0.44 0.26 0.29 0.30 0.55 -0.72 -0.97 0.30 0.14 -0.57 -0.16 -0.31 0.38 -0.05
γ1 -1.43 -2.88 -1.30 -0.65 -1.24 0.69 0.08 0.12 0.31 -0.97 -1.22 0.17 0.15 -0.93 -0.80 -0.84 0.39 -0.49
γ2 -1.56 -3.54 -1.68 -0.17 -1.44 1.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.12 -1.08 -1.02 0.09 0.18 -1.17 -0.82 -0.87 0.32 -0.71
γ3 2.55 3.30 2.21 1.70 1.17 0.46 0.25 0.25 0.36 1.59 2.04 0.19 0.26 0.71 1.14 1.09 -0.21 0.69
γ4 -0.40 -0.71 -0.40 -0.28 -0.29 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.31 -0.35 0.02 -0.05 -0.16 -0.27 -0.23 0.05 -0.21
γ5 0.15 1.78 0.30 -0.09 0.91 -0.95 -0.35 0.05 -0.26 0.59 0.34 -0.37 -0.09 0.72 0.49 0.50 -0.19 0.59
δ0 0.65 1.14 1.31 1.77 1.08 1.70 1.28 1.50 1.86 1.26 1.59 0.93 1.55 0.75 2.19 1.47 1.09 1.40
δ1 0.66 -0.05 0.21 0.05 -0.56 0.12 0.11 0.25 0.16 0.12 0.13 0.21 0.10 0.25 -0.62 -0.19 0.11 0.12
δ2 -0.41 -0.22 -0.69 -0.92 0.06 -1.13 -0.73 -0.69 -1.12 -0.61 -0.70 -0.30 -0.92 -0.22 -0.56 -0.59 -0.68 -0.71
δ3 0.16 0.21 -0.05 -0.22 0.36 -0.16 0.14 -0.15 -0.27 0.09 -0.24 0.17 -0.08 0.41 -0.16 0.06 0.25 0.19
δ4 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05
δ5 0.00 -0.06 0.18 0.27 0.01 0.33 0.16 0.05 0.29 0.06 0.20 0.00 0.20 -0.18 0.20 0.17 0.07 0.04
Fillmore
γ0 -0.50 -0.86 -0.16 -0.58 -0.96 0.00 -0.31 -0.88 -0.19 -0.31 -0.57 0.20 0.11 0.07 0.35 0.35 0.03 -0.01
γ1 -0.39 -0.52 -0.11 -0.34 -0.67 -0.18 -0.28 -0.69 -0.31 -0.39 -0.52 -0.06 0.01 0.03 0.23 0.21 -0.04 -0.03
γ2 -0.27 -0.28 -0.08 -0.17 -0.46 -0.27 -0.26 -0.54 -0.37 -0.42 -0.45 -0.22 -0.06 0.01 0.15 0.11 -0.08 -0.03
γ3 0.71 0.38 0.44 0.55 0.53 0.60 0.59 0.50 1.10 1.24 0.73 0.78 0.63 0.30 0.30 0.63 0.49 0.10
γ4 -0.05 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03
γ5 -0.17 0.44 -0.15 -0.09 0.36 -0.62 -0.38 0.22 -0.68 -0.73 -0.08 -0.76 -0.42 0.07 -0.16 -0.43 -0.28 0.21
δ0 2.49 2.12 1.22 1.59 1.65 1.36 1.55 2.43 1.86 1.60 1.92 0.78 1.18 0.67 1.09 1.47 0.92 0.98
δ1 -0.41 -0.34 0.13 -0.07 -0.08 -0.11 -0.07 -0.17 0.04 0.10 -0.06 0.24 0.24 0.42 0.33 0.21 0.31 0.17
δ2 -2.12 -1.82 -0.58 -1.10 -1.15 -0.99 -1.07 -1.76 -1.11 -0.83 -1.30 -0.10 -0.39 0.25 -0.14 -0.62 -0.10 -0.35
δ3 -0.52 -0.29 -0.16 -0.23 -0.22 -0.19 -0.29 -0.32 -0.28 -0.18 -0.21 0.06 0.04 0.25 0.07 -0.16 -0.04 0.04
δ4 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
δ5 0.75 0.57 0.24 0.41 0.36 0.45 0.31 0.32 0.27 0.17 0.25 -0.10 -0.05 -0.35 -0.16 0.12 0.02 -0.05
Mission
γ0 -0.07 0.04 -0.08 0.13 -0.55 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.13 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 0.14 0.14 0.27 0.30 -0.07 0.20
γ1 -0.09 0.02 -0.10 0.12 -0.56 -0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.11 0.01 -0.07 -0.04 0.04 0.03 0.23 0.24 -0.10 0.07
γ2 -0.10 0.01 -0.12 0.11 -0.57 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.10 0.01 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 0.19 0.19 -0.12 -0.03
γ3 -0.14 -0.02 -0.21 -0.03 -2.07 0.01 0.11 -0.05 0.15 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 0.16 0.19 0.36 0.37 -0.13 0.41
γ4 0.07 0.02 0.24 0.04 0.89 0.02 0.00 0.04 -0.08 -0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.10 -0.10 0.10 -0.09
γ5 -0.25 -0.11 -0.32 -0.08 -2.16 -0.07 -0.04 -0.24 0.12 -0.01 -0.12 -0.10 -0.17 -0.23 0.26 0.17 -0.29 -0.02
δ0 1.59 1.12 1.85 1.42 1.85 1.21 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.54 1.04 0.78 1.30 1.43 0.87 1.60 1.19 1.50
δ1 0.30 0.26 0.28 0.32 0.17 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.28 0.30 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.23 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.22
δ2 -0.85 -0.51 -0.98 -0.66 -1.24 -0.54 -0.31 -0.27 -0.30 0.10 -0.41 -0.21 -0.59 -0.84 -0.28 -0.92 -0.53 -0.92
δ3 -0.24 -0.08 -0.64 -0.26 -0.29 -0.07 0.16 0.21 0.21 0.36 0.13 0.31 -0.05 -0.06 0.15 -0.24 0.01 -0.28
δ4 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01
δ5 0.22 0.19 0.49 0.18 0.43 0.09 -0.10 -0.14 -0.15 -0.33 -0.08 -0.21 0.06 0.19 -0.07 0.23 0.03 0.36
* Note we estimate all coefficients for each month separately. Since the estimates are very similar across months, for brevity, we report the
average across months in the table.
Table 10 Block Index
Marina
1 AVILA ST 0 5 CHESTNUT ST 2300 9 LOMBARD ST 2000 13 LOMBARD ST 2400 17 SCOTT ST 3200
2 CHESTNUT ST 2000 6 CHESTNUT ST 2400 10 LOMBARD ST 2100 14 MALLORCA WAY 0 18 SCOTT ST 3300
3 CHESTNUT ST 2100 7 DIVISADERO ST 3200 11 LOMBARD ST 2200 15 PIERCE ST 3200 19 STEINER ST 3300
4 CHESTNUT ST 2200 8 Marina ST 3300 12 LOMBARD ST 2300 16 PIERCE ST 3300
Fillmore
1 BUCHANAN 1800 10 FILLMORE 1400 19 FILLMORE 2300 28 LAGUNA 1600 37 SUTTER 1800
2 CALIFORNIA 2300 11 FILLMORE 1500 20 FILLMORE 2400 29 PINE 2300 38 SUTTER 2000
3 CALIFORNIA 2400 12 FILLMORE 1600 21 GEARY 1500 30 POST 1600 39 WASHINGTON 2400
4 CLAY 2400 13 FILLMORE 1700 22 GEARY 1600 31 POST 1700 40 WASHINGTON 2500
5 CLAY 2500 14 FILLMORE 1800 23 GEARY 1700 32 POST 1800 41 WEBSTER 1500
6 FILLMORE 1000 15 FILLMORE 1900 24 GEARY 1800 33 POST 1900 42 WEBSTER 1600
7 FILLMORE 1100 16 FILLMORE 2000 25 JACKSON 2300 34 SACRAMENTO 2400 43 WEBSTER 2100
8 FILLMORE 1200 17 FILLMORE 2100 26 JACKSON 2400 35 SACRAMENTO 2500 44 WEBSTER 2200
9 FILLMORE 1300 18 FILLMORE 2200 27 LAGUNA 1500 36 STEINER 1500 45 CALIFORNIA 902
Mission
1 16TH ST 3000 6 20TH ST 3500 11 MISSION ST 2000 16 MISSION ST 2500 21 VALENCIA ST 800
2 16TH ST 3100 7 21ST ST 3200 12 MISSION ST 2100 17 VALENCIA ST 400 22 VALENCIA ST 900
3 17TH ST 3300 8 22ND ST 3200 13 MISSION ST 2200 18 VALENCIA ST 500 23 VALENCIA ST 1000
4 18TH ST 3400 9 23RD ST 3300 14 MISSION ST 2300 19 VALENCIA ST 600 24 VALENCIA ST 1100
5 19TH ST 3400 10 BARTLETT ST 0 15 MISSION ST 2400 20 VALENCIA ST 700 25 VALENCIA ST 1200
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Figure 13 Moment Fits
Figure 14 Parking Time Distribution
